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Introduction
In his book Congress: The Electoral Connection, David Mayhew claims that most of
what occurs in the United States Congress
can be explained by the congressman's drive
for re-election (Mayhew 1974, 13). If we
accept Mayhew's thesis, it stands to reason
that campaigns are a very significant part of
the national political process and that the
factors that cause candidates to win or lose
elections are central to the study of congressional election campaigns. One of the most
obvious factors in determining the success of
a candidate to win elections is his or her
ability to raise funds. In examining races
for constitutional offices and the U.S. Senate, it was found that "heavy campaign
spending by either party . . . is highly
correlated to victory: the heavy spenders
winning 72 percent of the time. In cases
where one party spends 80 percent or more
of the money, the party engaged in heavy

spending wins all of the time" (Magleby
1986, 28).
Because of reforms in campaign finance
law in the last decade, contributions made to
candidates and expenditures made by candidates are recorded and disclosed. Although
there seems to be a correlation between a
candidate's expenditures and the election
outcome, much campaign activity goes
unrecorded. An important example of this
"unrecorded element" of campaigns, often
included in the larger subject of "soft money," is volunteerism. Candidates are not
required to report the volunteer time contributed to their campaigns, whether it be
contributed by individuals or groups of
individuals, such as labor unions and tax
exempt (SOl (c)) organizations. There seems
to be at least one invisible variable in the
equation for a campaign's success: contributions of unrecorded volunteer services.
Because volunteer work goes unrecorded, it
is difficult to tell exactly what impact it has
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on individual campaigns or federal elections
on the whole.
By one estimate, the "effective use of
volunteers can reduce a campaign's payroll
by 20 percent" (Webb and Mockus 1981,
19). Twenty percent of a small local election may not be significant, but millions of
dollars are spent on federal elections. In
1984, Jesse Helms (R-NC) spent $16.5
million in his campaign for re-election to the
U.S. Senate. His opponent, James Hunt,
spent $9.5 million just to lose (Ladd 1986,
1). Considering the astronomical expenditures of some Congressional elections, this
means that volunteer work could have quite
a sizeable impact on campaigns. Further, it
is likely that volunteers have a much greater
impact on campaigns than simply a reduction in campaign costs, which will be discussed later.
Unfortunately, because it is not recorded, volunteer work is impossible to quantify.
This may be the reason that not much attention is given to volunteerism in campaign
finance literature. My review of the literature is certainly not exhaustive, but I did not
find the topic I will discuss in this paper
addressed at any length in the literature I
surveyed. In the remainder of this paper, I
will first discuss campaign volunteerism in
general. I will then look at labor unions and
how campaigns may benefit from them in
ways that are unrecorded. Lastly, I will do
a brief examination of how tax exempt
organizations make unrecorded volunteer
contributions to campaigns.

Volunteers
Volunteers are worth more to a campaign
than the free labor they provide. "The
presence of volunteers gives a campaign
visibility and the appearance of momentum.

Volunteers suggest to voters that the candidate is worthy of commitment" (Webb and
Mockus 1981, 20). Webb and Mockus
further claim that not only do volunteers
"help deliver messages to voters--by licking
envelopes, writing notes or telephoning
friends--they are messages in themselves"
(1981, 20). Many voters know very little
about the group of candidates from which
they must choose. But those voters who
have a family member, friend, or neighbor
that has volunteered for one of the candidates may be more likely to vote for that
candidate. Volunteers perform more services for a campaign than their delineated
responsibilities suggest. In this way, volunteers are worth more to a candidate than the
money he would lose paying hired help to
perform the same labor.
Yet, despite the other advantages, the
biggest and most obvious advantage of using
volunteers is that they provide a lot of work
for no cost; and there is no requirement to
report volunteer contribution of time to the
Federal Elections Commission. The Code
of Federal Regulations (CFR) states:
The value of services provided without compensation by any individual who volunteers on behalf of
a candidate or political committee is not a political
contribution (11 CFR lOO.7(b)(3)).

Not only is volunteer work free, but
through one clause in the campaign finance
law, volunteer work can actually make it
possible for a Political Action Committee
(PAC) or political party to contribute more
to a campaign than it would otherwise be
allowed. This clause in the Code of Federal
Regulations is referred to as the "volunteer
intensive activity loophole." It reads as
follows:
The payment by a candidate for any public office
(including State or local office), or by such can-
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didate's authorized committee, of the costs of that
candidate's campaign materials which include
information on or any reference to a candidate for
Federal office and which are used in connection
with volunteer activities (such as pins, bumper
stickers, handbills, brochures, posters, and yard
signs) is not a contribution to such candidate for
Federal office, provided that the payment is not for
the use of broadcasting, newspapers, magazines,
billboards, direct mail or similar types of general
public communication or political advertising. The
payment of the portion of the cost of such materials
allocable to Federal candidates shall be made from
contributions subject to the limitations and prohibitions of the Act. For the purposes of II CFR
lOO.7(b)(16), the term "direct mail" means any
mailing(s) by commercial vendors or mailing(s)
made from lists which were not developed by the
candidate (11 CFR lOO.7(b)(16) emphasis mine).

The definition of the term "direct mail"
is crucial to the way in which organizations
are able to take advantage of this clause.
The portion of the CFR quoted above states
that the cost of materials for the purpose of
direct mail is considered a campaign contribution--regardless of whether a volunteer
works on this material. If, however, commercial vendors do not perform the mailing
of the material, and the mailing list used is
developed by the candidate or his campaign,
then the material is not considered to be
direct mail.
Limitations set on mailing lists should
not to be taken lightly. In fact, "the single
most important factor in the success of
direct mail fund raising is the list you use"
(Beaudry and Schaeffer 1986, 171). This
does not mean, however, that candidates
who must generate their own mailing lists
are at a serious disadvantage. Beaudry and
Schaeffer explain to campaigners that
"there's no better list than [their] own of
proven contributors" (1986, 171). So the
restriction on the origin of the mailing list is
probably not as big of a hindrance as it

might seem to candidates who choose to
take advantage of this loophole.
As Brooks Jackson of the Wall Street
Journal claims, political parties, political
actions committees, or other groups who
promote candidates for federal office, can-and do--take advantage of this clause
through political and fund raising mailings.
Jackson explains that an organization, such
as the Republican National Committee, can
fund the printing and postage of elaborate
and expensive mailings and prepare peel
away preprinted labels for the mailings
(Jackson 1988). As long as volunteer hands
place the address labels on these mailings,
no part of the cost of the mailings is con sidered--for the purpose of contribution limitations--to be a contribution to the campaign
of the promoted candidate. This kind of
activity is considered to be "volunteer intensive" and thus does not need to be reported
as a contribution. Here we see that a proper
understanding of the Code of Federal Regulations is crucial to the effective utilization
of campaign funds.
Ed Goaz, former legal counsel at the
Republican National Committee, claims in
reference to the "volunteer intensive activity
loophole," that no party has an exclusive
advantage over the other in using and interpreting campaign finance law. He does
admit, however, that this particular loophole
was both discovered by and is used most by
Republicans (Goaz 1988). So, although
Democrats tend to benefit more from
volunteerism in general, Republicans seem
especially adept at taking advantage of this
particular loophole in the federal code.
Of course with all of the advantages of
using volunteers also come some disadvantages. Unlike paid employees, volunteers
have no obligation to perform quality work-and nothing to lose if they don't. They are
often unreliable and are even considered a
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"pain in the neck" (Webb and Mockus 1981,
19). Various campaigns may see the disadvantages to using volunteers to be greater
than the advantages and, therefore, choose
to use hired help rather than volunteers.
Although it is impossible to tell with the
available data, it appears that Democrats use
volunteers more than Republicans. It is
logical that various socio-economic factors
have an effect on how an individual will
contribute to her party, or the candidate of
her choice. For those who have sufficient
money, it may be easier to contribute dollars
than time, while those who earn very little
money may find that all they can contribute
is their time. This means that, because the
Democratic party is known as the party of
the poor and tends to attract the blue-collar
work force, it is likely that Republicans
donate dollars and Democrats donate time.
In their article on effective utilization of
campaign volunteers, Webb and Mockus cite
a nationwide poll sponsored by Targeting
Systems, Inc. of Washington, D.C. which
suggests that behind professors and students,
"blue-collar workers seem to be the third
most likely source of campaign workers"
(Webb and Mockus 1981, 20).
Although the national composition of the
volunteer force may seem primarily Democratic, regionally, this is not always the
case. Kay Christiansen, former campaign
manager to Rep. Wayne Owens (D-UT),
believes that in Utah there are several factors that work against the national trend. In
a state where the overwhelming majority of
the populace is Republican, where labor
unions are not particularly strong, and
where civic involvement is encouraged of
the many noncareer mothers in the state, it
is easy to imagine a Republican volunteer
force much stronger than a Democratic one
(Christiansen 1988). This heightened Republican volunteering may be one of the

factors that cause the GOP to continually
have so much success in Utah. Bob Bumek
of the Deseret News agrees with this theory
and points out that indeed Utah is atypical
on almost any issue dealing with partisanship (Bumek 1988).
Although not every campaign chooses to
use volunteers, they can be an important
part of a campaign that does choose to use
them. Volunteers can help the image of a
campaign, affect the voting decisions of
their families and friends, and provide a
significant force of labor at no cost. Labor
unions are one of the best and most organized ways for a campaign to get volunteers,
as well as being another interesting area in
which unrecorded contributions of service to
campaigns occur.

Labor Unions
Labor unions can be an important resource
of support for election campaigns in several
ways. Unions may distribute material and
communicate (via phone banks or otherwise)
to their "members, executive or administrative personnel, other employees, and their
families," supporting one candidate over
another in a federal election (11 CFR
114.4(c». When unions wish to communicate with the general public, however, that
communication must be purely educational
or participational, meaning that it must be
non-partisan. The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) states that labor unions may
1.

2.

make non-partisan registration and get-out-the-vote communications to the general public
(11 CFR 114.4(b)(2)),
distribute to the general public, or reprint in
whole and distribute to the general public,
any registration or voting information, such
as instructional materials, which has been
produced by the official election administrators (11 CFR 114.4(b)(3»,
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3.

4.

prepare and distribute to the general public
the voting records of Members of Congress
as long as the preparation and distribution is
not for the purpose of influencing a Federal
election (11 CFR 114.4(b)(4)), and
prepare and distribute to the general public
non-partisan voter guides consisting of questions posed to candidates concerning their
positions on campaign issues and the candidates' responses to those questions (11 CFR
114.4(b)(5)).

The CFR also enumerates many criteria by
which these activities may be judged to be
partisan. It would appear that any attempt
at partisan campaigning to the general public
by labor unions would be prohibited by the
CFR. All of these criteria, however, pertain
to the nature of the printed or spoken message given; there are no regulations that
dictate who these educational or participational campaigns must be directed toward.
If a get-out-the-vote drive is targeted at a
certain segment of the population already
known to be likely to vote Democrat, then,
although the drive is not illegally partisan,
the results may very well be partisan.
In addition to the support that labor
unions give as organizations, Brooks Jackson of the Wall Street Journal claims that
they also supply the Democrats a pool of
workers not available to Republicans (Jackson 1988). Unions are convenient for Democrats not only because of their partisanship
and the number of volunteers they can
provide, but because they are particularly
well equipped to do campaign work. Jackson explains that "a lot of what unions do is
run elections" within their own organizations, and are therefore well prepared to
make the transition to work on national
Once labor union
election campai:sns.
members make the decision to use their own
time to volunteer to work on a campaign,
they are individual volunteers. At this

point, they are no longer constrained by the
CFR that limits the activity of their union.
Besides the obvious advantage of manpower, labor unions also often have phone
banks in operation. This is a great advantage to candidates who have good relations
with unions--usually Democrat candidates.
A union uses its phone bank in the daytime
for inter-organizational work and then leases
the phone bank to a campaign after normal
business hours for campaign work (Jackson
1988). This kind of arrangement proves to
be particularly convenient for those campaigns who are supported by labor unions.
Beaudry and Schaeffer instruct campaign
managers that the smart approach is to go to
a "friendly business, labor union, or civic
organization that has multiple phone lines"
(Beaudry and Schaeffer 1986, 100). The
Code of Federal Regulations states that
persons . . . who make any use of corporate or
labor organization facilities, such as by using
telephones or typewriters or borrowing office
furniture, for activity in connection with a Federal
election are required to reimburse the corporation
or labor organization within a commercially
reasonable time in the amount of the nomlai and
usual rental charge. as defined in II CFR
l00.7(a){l)(iii)(B), for the use of the facilities (11
CFR 114.9(d), emphasis mine).

"Normal and usual rental charge" is defined
in the Code of Federal Regulations as "the
price of those goods in the market from
which they ordinarily would have been
purchased at the time of the contribution."
(11 CFR 100.7(a)(1)(iii) (B)).
It is difficult, however, to apply this
definition to the rental of a phone bank; a
phone bank is such an uncommon item of
rental that it is almost impossible to determine its going market rate. Because of the
affinity labor unions generally have for
Democrats, it seems reasonable that labor
unions would lease their phone banks to
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Democrats at a very low rate. As a result,
Democrats can, for a small fee, lease labor
union phone banks that are already in place.
Workers who are used to manning the
phones for the union can volunteer to work
on the campaign after hours. On the other
hand, for Republicans to set up a phone
bank, they must pay for the installation and
rental of phones, as well as find--and often
pay for--workers to man them.
"Installation can become a very expensive proposition since local phone companies
extract large deposits from political campaigns" (Beaudry and Schaeffer 1986, 100).
And indeed this is true. Central Communications Consultants of Salt Lake City informs that the rental charge for 30 standard
single-line phones is $500 per month. On
top of that, the phone company's (Mountain
Bell in this case) charge for the use of 30
phone lines would be $1,500 per month. If
a phone system is installed (a separate
charge), the use of the lines would cost $500
per month. This means that over a sixmonth period, a campaign could pay between $6,000 and $12,000 for each phone
bank they have in operation across the
country. This is a sizeable financial burden
for a campaign to bear.
The National Right to Work Committee
prepared a complaint filed in March of 1984
by Ralph Hettinga claiming that "eight labor
unions had made prohibited in-kind contributions by providing telephone services and
equipment and office space to Walter Mondale's presidential prenomination campaign
at less than fair market value" (Alexander
1987, 48). But how can the "fair market
value" of such services be accurately assessed? We can determine how much it
would cost for a campaign to run a phone
on its own (above paragraph), but that does
not determine the fair market value of the
part-time rental of a phone bank; if a cam-

paign uses the phone bank of another organization after hours, then using the cost to
run a phone bank independently certainly
would be an excessive rental fee.
It is important to note that there is somewhat of a Republican equivalent to the
Democrat-favored labor union; it is the
corporation. Throughout the Code of Federal Regulations, corporations and labor unions are discussed together, as if they were
the same type of organization. Often there
will be a section of code addressing labor
union behavior followed by a nearly identical section of code addressing the activity of
corporations. So it is important to remember that any tactic used by labor unions to
benefit Democrats may also be used by
corporations to benefit Republicans.
There are some factors concerning nonreported benefits of service that seem to
give a campaign which is more closely tied
to labor unions an advantage over a campaign that is supported by a corporation.
Some of these factors have already been
mentioned. First, the nature of labor unions
is such that they already have phone banks
set up. They are political organizations,
accustomed to using phone banks for internal politics. Corporations, on the other
hand, do not have the same type of political
structure and do not have the same kind of
need for a phone bank as do labor unions.
Second, those who belong to labor unions are more likely to be volunteers. The
Target Systems, Inc. poll, referred to earlier
in this paper, states that after professors and
students, blue collar workers are the third
most likely group to volunteer time to political campaigns. Apparently, white collar
workers--those who would most likely be
corporation employees--were not likel y
enough to volunteer to be mentioned. While
it is true that some blue-collar workers are
members of unions and employees of corpo-
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rations at the same time, there are some
important differences. The composition of
the leadership of the two organizations is
very different.
The leadership of labor unions is composed of blue-collar workers, which is very
different from the executive, uppermiddle
class composition of corporation leadership.
Also, the organization from which an individual gains his or her identity should be
considered. Blue-collar workers are consistently more loyal to their unions than their
corporate employers.
Third, labor unions are renowned for
being a serious political force in that their
members will vote as a block for the candidate they endorse--usually a Democratic
candidate. Although corporation executives
are likely to have the same interests among
themselves and therefore vote for the same
candidates, corporations do not have the
same history of voting loyally in blocks.
Clearly, labor unions are an important
sources of unreported volunteer service
contributions in the acts they perform as a
union and as a vehicle by which to attract
prospective campaign volunteers. These
same types of valuable contributions to
campaigns are provided by other organizations which are, unlike labor unions, not
constrained by the Federal Election Commission.

SOle

Or~anizations

Beyond labor unions, Democrats enjoy
another major source of unrecorded volunteer contributions. The "Non-Profit! Democrat Political Network," as labeled in a
recent National Republican Senatorial Committee report prepared by Bob Bissen, the
Director of Special Projects at the National
Republican Senatorial Committee, has

emerged as another source of "volunteerlike" effort .. The tax-exempt organizations
(known as 501(c) organizations) in this
network perform many of the same functions
normally performed by volunteers; these are
activities that here too are not reportable to
the Federal Elections Commission.
The two 50I(c) organizations in the
"network" that concern themselves with
political campaigns are 501(c)(3) (charitable
or educational) organizations, and 50I(c)(4)
(social welfare) organizations (Tax-&empt
Organizations 1987, 6). The report explains
that understanding the limitations on political
activity that these organizations have helps
to explain what the organizations do.
A 501(c)(3) organization "may not participate directly on behalf of, or in opposition to, any candidate for public office."
Like labor unions, it can perform educational and participational communication activities directed toward the general public. A
50I(c)(4) organization "must operate primarily in a manner designed to further the
common good by bringing about social
improvement and civic betterment." The
group may be clearly partisan and may
openly support or oppose a candidate "as
long as the primary purpose of the group
remains promotion of social welfare" (Tax&empt Organizations 1987, 6). "Social
welfare" is obviously a broad category; this
kind of ambiguity certainly accounts for the
freedom with which these groups act, a
subject which will be discussed later.
The above mentioned report, known as
the Kasten Report, claims that there are
many 501 (c) organizations that involve
themselves in political campaigns, but that
"there is a nationwide network of groups [in
25 states] working together" headed by the
group known as Citizen Action. The report
states that "shared office space, affiliates
listed on letterhead and similar boards of
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directors and officers help tie the various
groups together" (Tax-Exempt Organizations
1987, 1).
The groups in this network were found
to perform many of the same volunteer
efforts previously discussed in the labor
union section of this paper. A Citizen
Action brochure explains some of the services it provides for candidates the group
chooses to support.
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

The Electoral Canvass. A membership contact, voter education and get-out-the-vote
program.
Volunteer recruitment.
Issues development and briefing papers.
Phone banks.
Media. Free media on the candidate's stands
on the issues and paid media in targeted
races.
Professional staff assistance. Citizen Action
staff are trained and experienced in campaign
management and a variety of campaign skills
(Tax-Exempt Organizations 1987,2).

The Kasten Report was prepared in
reaction to the experience of Senator Bob
Kasten (R-WI) with the Wisconsin Action
Coalition (WAC) in his 1986 Senatorial race
against Ed Garvy . WAC campaigned to
defeat Kasten in his efforts to become reelected, but did not succeed. The report
claims that other Republican senators and
Senate candidates across the nation were
similarly attacked by groups like WAC. "In
races nationwide groups such as WAC tried,
and in many cases succeeded, in having a
major impact on behalf of the Democrat in
the race" (Tax-Exempt Organizations 1987,
1).

In the Wisconsin Kasten/Garvey senatorial race, WAC and other 50I(c) organizations affiliated with the national Action
Coalition, spearheaded a "truth drive,"
passing out flyers and holding press conferences. WAC claims that on election day it

made 18,500 get-out-the-vote phone calls
and believes itself to be responsible for 2-4
percent of the total votes cast for Ed Garvey
(Tax-Exempt Organizations 1987, 5).
The report claims that WAC "is one of
a growing number of groups that have taken
advantage of their Internal Revenue Service
50I(c) (3) or 501(c)(4) tax exempt status and
become increasingly active in political campaigns, providing either direct or indirect
assistance to candidates" (Tax-Exempt Organizations 1987, 1). As mentioned, a national 501(c) organization, known as Citizen
Action is the parent group of many of these
organizations (Tax-Exempt Organizations
1987, 2).
Steve Taggart of the Public Affairs
Advisory Group in Salt Lake City claims
that much of what Kasten experienced in
Wisconsin also occurred in various 1986
state and national races in Idaho. Taggart
reports that Idaho Fair Share, a 501(c)
organization, performed get-out-the-voter
drives, sent lawn sign crews, and created
publicity in much the same way WAC did in
Wisconsin. Idaho Fair Share even performed "die-ins" (where participants lay seemingly lifeless on the ground) to attract media
attention (Taggart 1988).
These 501(c) organizations must answer
to the Internal Revenue Service, but federal
and state regulation of them is minimal and
much of their activity goes unreported.
Organizations such as those discussed above
do not necessarily have to be in support of
Democratic candidates. All of those in this
1986 "network," however, supported Democrats and such organizations seemed to have
a significant impact on the outcome of at
least one congressional election.
Ben Ginsberg, of the National Republican Senatorial Committee, stated in a telephone interview that there are no "behind
the scenes" groups like those discussed
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above for Republican candidates (Ginsberg
1988). This suggests that although both
parties can benefit from the unrecorded
volunteer services of 501(c) organizations,
both parties don't.
It would be valid to investigate the
legality of the behavior of these tax -exempt
organizations, and further, it might be a
valuable exercise to scrutinize the law concerning these types of organizations. For
the purpose of this paper, however, the
significance of the activities of these organizations and others lies in their unrecorded
effect on the outcome of federal elections.
Because contributions of volunteer effort are
not considered contributions according to the
Code of Federal Regulations, a supportive
organization (PAC, political party, 501(c)
group, etc.) can donate large sums of money
in addition to the volunteer effort they coordinate and provide without going over their
contribution limit. A candidate can have the
advantage of claiming to be the "poor" man
in the race when in actuality, he may be
receiving the same benefits as his opponent
who must pay for these services. Also, if
they are unrecorded, then they are very
likely also going to be uncalculated. In
other words, when engineering elections or
studying the causes of victory or defeat in
elections, we may be ignoring some very
significant factors.

Conclusions
Beyond a candidate's ability to raise campaign funds is his or her ability to use those
funds effectively. If any of the factors in
the formula for a successful election campaign is overlooked, then the campaign may
be mishandled. When Federal Election
Statistics are released, it is easy to find the
number of dollars spent in the campaign of

a congressional election candidate, but
because candidates are not required to record and report volunteer activity, it is very
difficult, if not impossible, to uncover this
information. It is then only a hope to be
able to determine the significance of these
activities in federal elections.
Judging from the reaction of some to
unrecorded volunteer contributions, we can
conclude that they have at least some significance. Critics of the Federal Election Commission claim that certain "expenditures may
be legal but they escape federal campaign
disclosure requirements," and that they have
created a "underground political economy"
(Alexander 1987, 54). These critics list
several such expenditures, including:
Use of corporate and union or membership organization treasury funds to pay the costs of nonreportable communications with employees, stockholders
or members advocating the election or defeat of
specific candidates.
Use by tax-exempt foundations of unlimited and
undisclosed tax-deductible money--some of it
channeled to the foundations by national party
committees and their allies--to pay for ostensibly
nonpartisan but carefully targeted voter registration
and turnout drives (Alexander 1987, 53).

The ethics of much of what goes on in
this underground political economy are
questionable. Is it ethical to keep the letter
of a law but act in a way that is contrary to
the intent of that law? The logic of the law
is also somewhat problematic. If the loopholes that are currently discovered and used
exist, then how many more undiscovered
loopholes may there be? There are certainly
more than I have discussed in this paper.
These are all very valid topics of discussion but, after having studied the subject of
unrecorded volunteer contributions made to
election campaigns, it would be difficult for
me to editorialize on the ethical aspects of
this underground political economy or make
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recommendations for a change in federal
policy or federal election law. There is
simply not enough data to make a thorough
study of this situation, or problem, as many
see it. The only definite conclusion I can
make is that unrecorded volunteer campaign
contributions and the effect they have on
federal elections is an area that needs further
research.
Tenuously, I can also make some other
conclusions. It seems that labor unions and
tax-exempt organizations give Democrats a
serious advantage over Republicans in the
area of volunteer contributions, and this
advantage is not reported. Some may consider this to be a just advantage that merely
raises Democrats up to equal ground in
campaign resources with Republicans, who
consistently benefit from dollar contributions. Others may consider it to be an
unfair advantage--one that should be ended
by forcing organizations to report contributions of volunteer effort, counting them
against their contributions limitations.
I would suggest an approach that takes
both of these sides of the argument into
consideration. Contribution of volunteer
effort ought to be quantified and reported,
but not counted against an individual's or

organization's contribution limit.
This
would accomplish several important ends.
First, those who are now able to falsely
claim to be financial underdogs could no
longer do so in the same manner that they
have been. Second, forcing volunteer contributions to be counted as part of an organization's contribution limits would
discourage volunteerism, and in turn discourage much of the populace from important active participation in the political
process. Under my proposal, campaigns
would still be rewarded for using volunteer
labor. It stands to reason that the greater
the awareness of, and value placed on,
volunteer activity--of the many types heretofore discussed--the more likely members of
this democracy will be to participate. This,
in tum, increases the integrity of our idea of
true representation. Lastly, with the mandatory reporting of volunteer activity, the art
of engineering campaigns moves closer to
being a science. This will not only provide
academics with fascinating and useful information, but it may result in increased use of
volunteers in campaigns. And this, in turn,
could very well result in less money being
spent on now astronomically expensive
congressional elections.
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Political Perestroika and the Rise of Rukh
Ukrainian Nationalism, 1989-90
by
Scott Cooper

Introduction

The Soviet Union without the Ukraine may
never have become a superpower. The
Ukraine's fertile soil, situated in a relatively
mild climate, has been breadbasket to Russia
for almost four centuries. Its rich mineral
resources provided much of the coal and
iron necessary for Stalin's industrialization,
and its millions of skilled workers provided
much of the manpower. In fact, Roman
Szporluk points out that, because Great
Russians make up only about 52 percent of
the Soviet Union, the Ukrainians and Byelorussians (between them compromising 20
percent of the population) are the crucial,
marginal factor which allows continued
Slavic domination of the diverse Soviet
empire (1986, 153). Without their cooperation, the empire would be too unwieldy and
unstable.

Precisely because of the Ukraine's importance, any nationalist or separatist feeling
within the Ukraine must be taken seriously.
Soviet historians attempt to minimize the
differences between Russians and their
Ukrainian kin. The Communist Party officially predicts and proclaims the gradual
merger of the two nationalities into one
people (Chirovsky 1984a, 17). In spite of
this, the Party has been unable to stamp out
Ukrainian nationalism, even by extreme
methods. And in the Gorbachev era nationalist feeling has exploded from hiding,
apparently only strengthened by centuries of
Russian domination and decades of Soviet
oppression. This paper will trace the development of this nationalist feeling in order to
show how historical factors have led to
recent, dramatic changes in Ukrainian politics. I will focus especially on this feeling
of nationalism, to the exclusion of economic
factors, in explaining Ukrainian political
change. While economic factors are obvi-
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ously a critical element in recent events,
space restrictions prevent me from discussing these factors in any detail.

Cossack state is the historical source of
modem Ukrainian nationalism. The memory of this period of autonomy has driven
twentieth century nationalists to seek greater
freedom from Moscow.

Kievan-Rus' and Polish Rule
The Ukraine first existed as the Kievan-Rus'
state, which reached the peak of its territorial expansion under Prince Vladimir one
thousand years ago. Vladimir ruled virtually all of the European portion of the presentday USSR, from the Black Sea in the south
to the White Sea in the north, and from the
Danube in the west to the Volga basin in the
east (Chirovsky 1984a, 124). But, because
of its size, Vladimir's empire proved too
weak to survive, although he tried to unify
it by Christianizing his subjects. In the
years 1236 to 1240 the weakened kingdom
was thoroughly conquered by the invading
Mongols. One hundred years later, the
weakened Mongols were displaced by a
Lithuanian-Rus' commonwealth. But the
commonwealth was short-lived; in l385,
Lithuania united with a stronger Poland and
ended Rus' sovereignty. Also at this time,
the name "Ukraine" (literally, "at the edge")
emerged because of the nation's position at
the border of Europe and Asia.
Catholic Poland ruled the Ukraine for
almost three centuries but was bitterly resisted by the Orthodox Ukrainian nation.
Poland exploited the Ukraine's resources
and population without preventing attacks by
Crimean Tatars and other invaders from the
East (Chirovsky 1984b, 28-29). The result
of this unrest was the emergence of the
Cossacks, groups that fled Polish rule for
the vast steppes of the eastern and southern
Ukraine, which were free of foreign domination. By the mid-1500s these Cossacks
had elected a "hetman" as their leader and
considered themselves autonomous. This

Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Russian Rule
The year 1648 marked the triumphant peak
of the Cossack state; Hetman Bohdan
Khmelnytsky destroyed the Polish army and
declared the Ukraine a sovereign state. As
usual, however, Ukrainian independence
was short-lived. By 1654 continued war
with Poland had weakened the Ukraine
dramatically and Khmelnytsky was forced to
form an alliance with the newly emergent
Muscovite Empire. Ukrainian historians
claim that Khmelnytsky's 1654 treaty with
Russia was merely a military alliance (Chirovsky 1984b, 183), but for over three centuries Russian and Soviet leaders have interpreted the treaty as a complete Ukrainian
submission to Moscow.
Russia, as the stronger power, was able
to interpret the treaty as it saw fit, despite
Ukrainian protest.
Ukrainian autonomy
gradually decreased until, from 1763 to
1783, Catherine the Great introduced serfdom to the Ukraine, tying the peasants to
the land. The next century and a half of
tsarist rule failed, however, to "Russify" the
Ukrainian people; history had given the
Ukraine a taste of autonomy and independence which tsarist restrictions could not
overcome.

Bolshevik Rule
Upon seizing power in 1917, one of the
Bolsheviks' first acts was a "Declaration of
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the Rights of the Peoples of Russia," which
granted sovereignty and even separation to
the Russian Empire's nationalities (Dmytryshyn 1977, 485). The Ukrainian Rada
(or parliament) in Kiev established an independent Ukrainian Peoples Republic within
days. The next two years saw bitter civil
war in the Ukraine, which was alternately
controlled by the Bolshevik Red Army,
Germany, Ukrainian nationalists, the White
Army, and finally by the Red Army. In
1921 the Ukraine was split between Poland
and Russia and on December 30, 1922, the
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, with its
capital at Kiev, entered the Soviet Union.
By the mid-1920s, Mykola Skrypnyk, a
Ukrainian Bolshevik who advocated the
"Ukrainization" of the republic, was the
dominant political figure in the Ukraine.
Although his power was limited, he was
able to increase the number of Ukrainians in
the party elite, the use of the Ukrainian
language in political life, and the number of
books and newspapers published in Ukrainian (Mace 1983, 305). This limited Ukrainization, however, was terminated by Stalin
by 1932. Skrypnyk was denounced and
committed suicide. The forced collectivization of 1932-33 crushed the Ukrainian peasantry and the accompanying famine left
millions dead.
The Ukrainians' next brief taste of freedom came when Nazi troops "liberated"
them during World War II. The Ukraine
soon turned against the oppressive German
rule and fought the Germans until the Red
Army returned to the Ukraine in 1944--at
which point the Ukrainian nationalists turned
their weapons against the communists.
Bilocerkowycz states that anti-Soviet guerilla
activities continued until 1950, with isolated
attacks as late as 1956 (1988, 20).

Since Stalin
Since Stalin's death, nationalism has been
expressed mainly through the dissident
movement. These dissidents have called for
increasing Ukrainian autonomy and Ukrainization as well as for basic human rights.
Each of the postwar communist leaders of
the Ukraine has treated dissent harshly; the
dissidents of the post-Stalin era have faced
lengthy jail sentences, forced exile, and
"psychiatric treatment." But the dissident
movement has survived. Bilinsky even
suggest that the crackdowns have only produced "professional oppositionists" who
have survived labor camps and returned to
dissent (1983, 9).
Between 1953 and 1976 both the First
and Second Secretaries of the Ukrainian
Communist Party have been Ukrainians.
Even more importantly, the Ukrainian First
Secretary has been on the Soviet Politburo
since 1953. Thus, the traditional importance
of the Second Secretary of the non-Russian
republics has diminished in the Ukraine:
each of the First Secretaries (Shelest,
Shcherbitsky, and Ivashko) has been even
more powerful than his Second Secretary.
Almost all of the top positions in the Ukrainian party, government, and KGB have been
filled by Ukrainians. As mentioned previously, Ukrainians fill a crucial role in the
continued Slavic domination of the Soviet
Union. In fact, the Ukraine actually "exports" cadres to Moscow rather than importing them (Gustafson and Mann 1988, 37).
This obviously implies that the Ukrainians
have attained a high amount of trust in
Moscow. But Motyl also points out that
moving a Ukrainian party official to Moscow has the added advantage of separating
him from any independent power base in the
Ukraine, "preventing the formation of a
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native--autonomous--Ukrainian elite" (1987,
123).
This policy of isolation has not been
entirely successful though. In the 1950s,
Pyotr Shelest managed to form a strong
power base from which he pushed for greater Ukrainian sovereignty within the Soviet
Union and for cultural individuality, much
as Skrypnyk had done in the 1920s. His
Ukrainization led eventually to his replacement in 1972 by Vladimir Shcherbitsky,
who also established an independent power
base. Shcherbitsky, however, was strongly
pro-Russian and an enemy of Ukrainization.
Shcherbitsky's success shows that Ukrainian communists are useful to the Soviet
regime; Shelest's removal shows that those
same Ukrainian communists must tread
carefully to avoid offending Moscow.
Ukrainian nationalism is anathema to Soviet
leaders, even when mixed with a heavy dose
of communism. Up until the Gorbachev
period, the Ukraine and the Ukrainian Communist Party were tied firmly to Moscow.
Even though the various republics are constitutionally sovereign states, "their sovereignty seems to be limited only in all the
areas in which they might want to take
action" (Hough and Fainsod 1979, 483).

Gorbachev and Perestroika
Mikhail Gorbachev' s rise to power has
obviously brought unprecedented change to
the Soviet Union. But initial change came
very slowly to the Ukraine. Ruled under
the iron fist of longtime Ukrainian Party
leader Vladimir Shcherbitsky, the Ukraine
was among the most conservative republics.
Shcherbitsky's grip was not even loosened
by the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl. Long
after Gorbachev had removed all other
Brezhnev-era members of the Soviet Politbu-

ro, Shcherbitsky held on to power in the
Ukraine and in the Politburo. His power
and longevity in office probably stem from
his tight control of the Ukrainian party
machine and of the Ukraine's mineral,
industrial, and agricultural resources, which
are vital to the economic success of the
country as a whole (Keller 1989a, A6).
Shcherbitsky's grip began to fail in early
1989. Under pressure from Moscow, the
Ukraine held parliamentary elections which
allowed some degree of competition. Even
though Shcherbitsky himself ran without
opposition, several key Ukrainian party
figures were embarrassed by newcomers
(Keller 1989a, A6). It was an unmistakable
sign of dissatisfaction with the Ukrainian
Communist Party and thus with Shcherbitsky
himself. Then, in July the Ukraine's allimportant mines were paralyzed by a miners
strike and the formation of unofficial (hence,
illegal) committees to represent the republic's miners. With Moscow pressuring him
to solve the strikes peacefully and with an
unprecedented number of protesters involved
(tens or hundreds of thousands of people),
Shcherbitsky was unable to resort to the
repressive methods by which he had ruled
the Ukraine for seventeen years. He was
forced to yield to some of the miners' demands.
Perhaps the crucial event was the formation in September, 1989, of Rukh, the Ukrainian People's Movement for Restructuring. Rukh's founding congress united a
wide variety of different groups including
priests from both the Orthodox Church and
the (still illegal) Ukrainian Catholic Church,
reform-minded communists and intellectuals,
environmentalist "Greens," and the radical,
prison-hardened "professional oppositionists"
of the Ukraine Helsinki Union. Each group
had its own goals and demands--from reform
of the socialist system to outright secession
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from the Soviet Union--but they seemed to
unite in the recurring chant, "Shcherbitsky
. . . Resign" (Komsomolskaya Pravda 1989,
2).
Their common platform demanded
greater changes in the Ukrainian economy,
concern for the environment, and development of the Ukrainian culture (Izvestia 1989,
3).

tion put further pressure on I vashko and
Gorbachev to make more radical changes .
The year 1989 had marked a turning
point in Ukrainian politics. Popular unrest
had led to greater liberalization and to the
fall of the Ukraine's party chief. But the
underlying problems were not resolved and
Ivashko too would prove unable to stem the
rising flood of public anger and disillusionment.

Ivashko
The unification of such a broad range of
opposition groups mortally wounded Shcherbitsky's power base. Within weeks of the
Rukh congress, Gorbachev was able to
remove Shcherbitsky from the Soviet Politburo and, one week later, from the head of
the Ukrainian Party. His replacement was
Vladimir Ivashko, a protege of Shcherbitsky, who nonetheless saw the need for
economic reform. He offered to help Rukh
obtain legal status and to cooperate with the
nationalists as long as they refrained from
advocating secession from the USSR (Keller
1989b, AI3). In this way he hoped to
moderate Rukh's most extreme demands.
Unfortunately for Ivashko, events were
already moving rapidly, especially in the
western Ukraine which had been free of
Soviet rule until World War II and which
was less Russified than the eastern portion
of the republic. Frequent demonstrations
continued and in late October more than one
hundred peoples' fronts from allover the
USSR met at Chelyabinsk to discuss the
democratization of the Soviet Union. One
writer called the meeting "a people's Duma
that is trying to sum up and express all the
opinions in our society," referring to the
tsarist Duma, a sort of weak parliament
(Zhavoronkov 1989, 13). Each new demonstration and each new meeting and organiza-

1990 Elections
The republic-wide elections of February and
March, 1990, shifted the political balance in
the Ukraine. The odds were stacked fairly
heavily against Rukh: It could not officially
nominate candidates because it was not
recognized in time by the government, it
was not allowed to publish its own newspaper, and the Communist Party was able to
guarantee safe seats to many of its own
officials (Keller 1990, A12). In spite of
these difficulties, Rukh-approved candidates
managed to win one-fourth of the seats in
the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. Also, Ivashko and many other senior communists were
unable to win on the first ballot and were
forced into run-off elections. By contrast,
many Rukh leaders won on the first ballot,
including several former political prisoners
representing the Ukraine Helsinki Union
(Keller 1990, AI2). Ivashko eventually, but
not easily, retained his seat and was elected
chairman of the republic's parliament, making him head of both the Ukrainian Party
and government.
In July, Ukrainian miners provoked a
political avalanche by threatening another
strike. Their basic demands included the
resignation of the government (because of its
failure to carry out the promises of the
previous year) and the removal of the Party
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from economic decision-making (Izvestia
1990, 1, 3). The Ukrainian parliament,
with many of its conservative communist
majority in Moscow for the Communist
Party Congress, felt itself unable to deal
with the strike and so it ordered all missing
members to return to Kiev immediately
(Tsikora 1990a, 2). The majority returned
but Ivashko, as a Politburo member and a
key figure in the Party Congress, was unable to return. Criticizing both the parliament's order to return and those communists
in the Ukrainian parliament who had supported the order, Ivashko resigned his chairmanship of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet
(while retaining his leadership of the party).

Soverei 2nty
His replacement, Leonid Kravchuk, the
Second Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, was not elected for two weeks.
This interval saw remarkable changes in the
Ukraine. On July 16, 1990, the Ukrainian
Supreme Soviet overwhelmingly declared
(355 to 4) the republic's political sovereignty (Clines 1990a, AI). In startlingly clear
language, parliament claimed the "supremacy, independence, fullness, and indivisibility
of the republic's power on its territory and
its independence and equality in external
relations" (Clines 1990a, A10). The declaration claimed for the Ukraine the right to
its own citizenship; the right to control its
own natural resources; the right to create its
own financial, currency, and economic
systems; the right to annul laws passed in
Moscow; and the right to control troops on
its own territory (Pravda 1990, 2; Clines
1990a, AI, A10). The Ukraine did not
claim full independence, but its declaration
was reminiscent of the sovereign Cossack
state of the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-

ries. The New York Times noted that the
"declaration was crafted to reflect the Ukraine's rich history of centuries of dynasty
and principality, when Kiev was a major
political, commercial, and cultural center"
(Clines 1990a, AlO).
The declaration of sovereignty marked
the Ukraine as one of the most radical of the
Soviet Union's fifteen republics. Only the
three Baltic republics have gone further and
claimed the right to secede from the union.
It is important to note the near unanimity of
the vote, indicating that both communist and
Rukh delegates to the Ukrainian Supreme
Soviet saw the need (or felt the public pressure) for radical change. The fifteen republics will soon be negotiating a new treaty of
union with Moscow and the Ukraine appears
to have staked out a rigid negotiating posiIt remains to be seen whether
tion.
Gorbachev has the power to force compromise on the republics.
These steps towards sovereignty, however, proved only the prelude to even greater
demands. With store shelves consistently
empty, the Ukrainian discontent continues to
grow. On September 30, Rukh and other
nationalist groups held a huge procession
and rally in downtown Kiev. Izvestia reported that over one hundred thousand
people attended, making it the largest such
unofficial rally held in Kiev in the postWorld War II era (Tsikora 1990b, 1-2).
The next day saw the beginning of a republic-wide strike which, although it included
only a fraction of the republic's workers,
increased the perception of discontent. The
Ukrainian Supreme Soviet certainly must
have noticed. The following day's events
added to the pressure: Policemen and protesters clashed near the Supreme Soviet
building, leaving twenty demonstrators and
fifteen policemen injured (Tsikora 1990c,
2).
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Student Protest
A small group of students escalated the
situation one step further in early October.
As an outgrowth of the relatively unsuccessful work stoppage, about two hundred students started a hunger strike in a tent city
they had constructed in Kiev's central plaza,
at the very feet of the imposing statue of
Lenin. (Somewhat ironically, the plaza is
named the Square of the October Revolution.) The hunger strike mushroomed into
republic-wide student protest.
Tens of
thousands of students travelled to Kiev in
support. Colleges across the city and republic were barricaded and closed by students
refusing to attend classes. Demonstrators in
other cities voiced their support. According
to the New York Times,
The student demonstration appeared to provide
what Rukh and other opposition outlets had not yet
been able to apply, a simple focus, with doctors
dramatically measuring the hunger strikers' health,
for venting dissatisfaction with the communist
status quo and its hard economic times (Clines
1990b, A4).

The student demands increased the
radicalization of Ukrainian politics. Criticizing the only-partially democratic elections
of the previous spring, students called for a
republic-wide referendum on whether or not
to dissolve the parliament and hold new
elections. This referendum would in effect
be a vote of confidence in the parliament
(Reuters 1990, A6). The hunger strikers
also demanded a new constitution implementing the J ul y declaration of sovereignty,
laws allowing Ukrainian military recruits to
serve on Ukrainian soil, confiscation of the
Communist Party's vast property holdings,
and the resignation of the Ukraine's Prime
Minister, Vitaly Masol (Clines 1990b, AI,
A4).

Two weeks later, the Ukrainian Supreme
Soviet accepted most of the demands.
Prime Minister Masol agreed to step down
and the Supreme Soviet agreed to a new
constitution, a referendum on dissolving
parliament, and a law keeping Ukrainian
troops in the Ukraine. In short, they agreed
to begin putting into law those rights
claimed in theory in July. This will certainly meet with opposition in Moscow, increasing the Ukraine's conflict with Gorbachev.
In addition, a substantial portion of the
Ukrainian population opposes these changes.
This group includes not only communists
with a stake in the status quo but also ethnic
Russians worried by an increasingly antiRussian Ukrainian nationalism. Finally, the
student protest has forced Rukh to further
radicalize its own demands (Clines 1990b,
A4). Previously Rukh had avoided calling
for outright independence (although some
groups under the Rukh umbrella had done
so). Now, in order to stay in the lead of
public opinion, Rukh fully endorsed complete independence from the USSR.

Conclusions
Lenin remarked once that "for us to lose the
Ukraine would be the same as losing our
head" (Keller 1989b, A13). An observer
viewing the Ukraine in 1985 might have
assumed (as many did) that the Ukraine had
no strong nationalist feelings and the Ukrainian and Russian nations had virtually become one. With the exception of a few
dissident groups, the Ukraine seemed passively content with its role in the Soviet
state. Recent events, though, have proved
this view false. It is becoming increasingly
clear that the Ukrainian nation exists and
remembers its past independence, however
short-lived. And seventy years of commu-
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nist repression has only deepened that feeling. The explosive nature of that sentiment
surprised both Western and communist
observers--inc1uding Mikhail Gorbachev.
Today, Ukrainian public discussion is almost
controlled by nationalist voices. The dismal
economic situation fans the flames of dissent. Even the communist-dominated parliament has rebelled and demanded greater
freedom and autonomy than Moscow appears willing to offer. Unless Gorbachev is
able to neutralize the Ukraine's current
momentum, the Soviet Union may have to
learn to live without its head.
Gorbachev does have a few remaining
cards to play though. First, the Ukrainian

parliament, although rebellious, is still
controlled by Communist Party members
with a personal stake in the status quo.
Second, the Ukraine's sizable Russian minority and the Russification of the eastern
Ukraine provide a check on any thoughts of
independence. Third, the powers of the
state, especially the Army, are still controlled by Moscow, giving Gorbachev very
real leverage in overcoming rebellion. Will
Gorbachev resort to such drastic measures to
hold the Soviet Union together? It appears
increasingly possible that he or some other
Soviet leader will face just such a choice in
the Ukraine in the not-so-distant future.

,
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The Future of the Spanish State
in the Wake of Regionalistic Nationalism and Separatist Fervor
by
Deidre J. Jensen

Introduction

In the post-World War II era, demands for
regional autonomy have been a recurring
feature in Western Europe. These demands
have been based on the inability of the
modern nation-state to solve all of the political, economic, and social problems it faces.
As regions are continually confronted with
an inadequate central government that is
limited by a lack of resources and political
will, those peoples who feel most alienated,
deprived, or exploited will agitate for more
control over their own affairs. Nowhere is
this situation more prevalent than in modern
Spain.
Since its founding, Spain has been a
nation of varied cultures, languages, governments, and histories. Although attempts
have been made to unify these diverse peoples, the historical differences between the
regions have

continued to threaten the existence of the
centralized state. Moxon-Browne gives two
explanations for this grave situation. First,
as a result of the historical uneven economic
development of Spain, a situation of "internal colonialism" has emerged. This has
been characterized by the exploitation of the
poorer regions by those that are more economically advanced and by the refusal of the
economically strong regions to contribute to
the development of the rest of the nation.
The economic deprivation on the one hand
and the refusal to share the wealth on the
other, especially when coupled with ethnic
pride, have both led to nationalistic fervor,
agitation for regionalist autonomy, and, at
times, the use of violent methods (MoxonBrowne 1989, 41).
Second, as in the Basque country, periods of rapid industrialization have brought
many immigrants into the region. The
resulting social upheaval has created a feeling of alienation among the native people, a
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fervent ethnic and cultural consciousness,
and a desperate grasp for their traditional
and historical roots. This emerging nationalism has also quickly led to a desire for
regional autonomy (Moxon-Browne 1989,
41). Although not exclusive, these are two
of the many possible explanations for the
regionalist sentiment which has continually
Even
influenced the history of Spain.
though the Spanish government has tried to
address this problem by granting partial
autonomy to the regions, many regions such
as Catalunya, the Basque country, and
others will not be satisfied without further
concessions. If concessions are not made,
there is a possibility that at least the Basque
country and Catalunya, the most economically strong regions in Spain, will demand
their independence. Unless this situation
changes drastically, the continuance of a
unified Spanish state will be threatened by
escalating conflicts between the regions
agitating for more autonomy and the central
government fighting to save its disintegrating nation.

Historical Back2round
Spain, until the fifteenth century, had been
a nation of diverse peoples separated by
geographical boundaries and ruled by separate governments. When modern Spain was
finally unified through the marriage of
Queen Isabel of Castile and King Ferdinand
of Arag6n in 1469, the capture of the last
Arab stronghold in Granada in 1492, and the
annexation of the Northern kingdom of
Navarre in 1512, Spain had already developed somewhat of a federal system of government. For example, when Charles I (the
grandson of Ferdinand and Isabel) came to
power, he was not known as the King of
Spain but rather as the King of Castile,

Le6n, Arag6n, Navarre, etc. Not only that,
but he had to promise to "respect the administrative, legal, financial, and cultural idiosyncracies of each kingdom or principality"
(Newton 1983, 100). This federal system
lasted until the seventeenth century when the
Bourbons of France tried to unify the administration of the country. Spain was soon
divided into fifty artificial provinces which
cut across regional boundaries. This situation did not change until the nineteenth
century.
A multitude of wars during the l800s
retarded Spain's material progress and
increased social and political divisions within the country. In the meantime, frustration
with the inertia and interference of the
Madrid bureaucracy led the Basque country
and Catalunya to pursue their own paths of
economic development.
Failure of the
centralized government to create a nationwide industrial complex coupled with the
rising nationalist sentiment of the Basque
country and Catalunya meant that by the
1900s, economic, social, and political differences between the regions and the central
government were irreconcilable. Although
attempts at granting partial autonomy to the
regions were made initially, following the
Civil War (1936-39), General Franco, the
military dictator, prohibited any evidence of
regionalism and autonomy. He desired a
unified state with one language (Castilian),
one leader (Franco), 3.'1d one church (Catholic). His regime was one of intolerance,
repression, and centralization. However, his
programs only succeeded in revitalizing
regional cultures and creating strong opposition to the concept of a unified Spain.
Following his death, the presence of regionalist nationalism and the desire for autonomy
was greater than it ever had been previously.
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The post-Franco era was characterized
by a resurgence in the autonomy movement,
which occurred for a variety of economic,
political, cultural, and demographic reasons.
In part, it was a reaction to years of oppressive government centralization throughout
the history of Spain. Also, it began because
of the social tensions which had arisen
between the immigrants and native peoples
in various regions throughout the country.
In addition, it could be attributed to the
uneven economic development between the
regions and the methods taken by the central
government to remedy that situation. Finally, it was a result of increased regionalist
nationalism, ethnic consciousness, and deepseated historical differences which were
impossible to reconcile (Donaghy and Newton 1987, 98). Whatever the reason, the
regions in the post-Franco era demanded
autonomy and decentralization. Their demands were met by the constitution of 1978,
the Constitution of the refurbished democratic Spain.

The Constitution of 1978
The Constitution of 1978 was a document of
compromise which, although not ideal, was
considered to be the primary step towards
more regional autonomy. It contains an
interesting mixture of centralized government and regional autonomy which is neither a federal system nor a nation-state
system. It primarily discusses the rights of
regions, the process of becoming autonomous, and the roles and responsibilities of
both the central and regional governments.
The regions of Spain are guaranteed
autonomy in Article 2 of the Constitution.
This article states that the "constitution is
based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible

motherland of all Spaniards, and recognizes
and guarantees the right to autonomy of the
nationalities and regions of which it is composed" (Donaghy and Newton 1987, 100).
(See appendix one). It is interesting to note
that the central government mentions the
indissoluble union of the state before it
mentions autonomy to express the overriding
idea that the centralized state will continue
even in the presence of autonomy.
After autonomy is guaranteed, Article
143.1 talks about the territorial basis for the
establishment of autonomous regions. It
declares that only "adjoining provinces with
common historical, cultural and economic
characteristics . . . will be able to accede to
self-government and form autonomous
communities" (Donaghy and Newton 1987,
100). This historical basis not only ensures
autonomous privileges but it is the deciding
factor in the length of time it will take to
acquire autonomy. The regions, such as the
Basque country, Catalunya, and Galicia,
which had historically voted in a referendum
to be autonomous could proceed quickly
towards full autonomy. The rest of the
regions would have to wait five years after
the approval of their statutes before they
could gain the same full autonomy guaranteed to the historic regions. According to
Donaghy and Newton, this was to give them
time to organize their own governmental
institutions for housing, public works, forestry, environmental protection, museums,
libraries, cultural affairs, tourism, social
welfare, health, and hygiene, etc. After the
regions gained autonomy, they would have
the primary control and jurisdiction over
each of these areas in their own territories
(Donaghy and Newton 1987, 113).
In addition to being able to control the
areas mentioned above, each autonomous
government is guaranteed the right to create
and execute its own laws, to exercise finan-

SEPARATISM IN SPAIN 27
cial autonomy (within the state's overall
responsibility for taxation), to control its
own budgets and educational system, to
write its own statutes (regional constitutions), to establish the parameters of its
relationship with the central government,
and to have its own capital city, flag, civil
service, and supreme court.
In contrast, there are certain powers
which belong solely to the central government. These include immigration, political
asylum, defence and the armed forces,
customs and trade barriers, the monetary
system, general economic planning, authorization of elections and referendums, overall
administration of justice, and the signing of
international agreements and treaties (Donaghy and Newton 1987, 114-115).
In addition, the constitution declares that
certain powers can be delegated by the
Federal Parliament to be shared by both the
federal and the regional governments.
These powers include the overall system of
communications, the ports and airports of
general interest, the post and telecommunications, the control of air-space and transport, and the academic professional qualifications.
The Spanish Constitution as it exists
today contains many strengths. It delegates
a great deal of authority to autonomous
regions while at the same time maintaining
the unity and cohesion of the state under a
centralized government. It is an extremely
important document for the Spaniards because it is the first constitution to acknowledge the multinational and multilingual
character of Spanish society and to establish
the principle of governmental decentralization. However, having these strengths does
not necessarily mean that this constitution
will be acceptable indefinitely. As regions
are experimenting more with autonomy they
are beginning to feel independent of the

central government. In fact, certain ones
are even considering total independence as
their next step. Since most of those advocating separatism are the economically
strong regions such as the Basque country
and Catalunya, it would be financially destructive to Spain if they succeeded. Not
only that, but it is quite possible that separation and independence for these regions
could create a tidal wave of regionalistic
sentiment which would result in the dissolution of at least part of the Spanish nation.
For these reasons, the Spanish central government is fighting against further separatist
concessions. The future of this struggle
could bring about many significant changes
in favor of one side or the other. At this
point all that is certain is that autonomy has
been granted and will not be relinquished
easily, neither the central government nor
the separatist regions plan to budge on their
demands, and, at some point in the future,
concessions will need to be made by somebody. In order to understand the events that
will surely happen, it is necessary to discuss
1) the factors which have caused regionalism
to occur; 2) the extreme cases of separatism-Catalunya and the Basque country; 3)
regionalism in other areas of Spain; 4) the
response of the central government; and 5)
what the future holds for the continuance of
Spain, the modern state.

Catalunya

Catalunya is a region of Spain which borders France to the north, the Mediterranean
Sea to the west, the Ebro basin to the east,
and coastal hills to the south. Because of
her geographical location, she has been
relatively isolated throughout a large part of
her history from the other areas of the
Iberian peninsula. As a result, her history

,

,

28 PSA REVIEW
has been distinct from that of the rest of
Spain.
Up until the fifteenth century, Catalunya
was an autonomous region ruled by the
counts of Barcelona. In 1289 the Generalitat de Catalunya was established which
"defined the traditional Catalonian liberties
and privileges as a bastion against the Centralizing encroachments of the Spanish
Crown" (Moxon-Browne 1989, 25). Catalunya's political identity was not threatened
until the male line of the counts of Barcelona became extinct in 1410 and the Catholic
kings unified Spain, including Catalunya, in
1469. At this point, Castile exercised the
most influence because of an economic
boom, her monopoly on trade with the
Americas, and few legal barriers. As a
result, Catalunya "which had been the major
component of the Catalan-Aragonese monarchy, lost political importance and influence
although it retained control over its own
affairs" (Coverdale 1979, 25).
Finally, in the seventeenth century it was
able to reassert its influence by refusing to
join the Hapsburg monarchy until its autonomy had been guaranteed (1653). However,
with the entrance of the Bourbon kings
during the 1700s, Catalunya lost the autonomy she had gained. This loss was soon
offset by her growing economic vitality;
she was even more prosperous in 1760 than
was Castile. During the 1700s regional
differences persisted but the Catalans supported the Spanish monarchy during the
French Revolution and the Napoleonic
Wars. In fact, Coverdale believes that by
this time, "a workable equilibrium had been
reached in which Catalunya could participate
in a larger Spanish national undertaking
without renouncing altogether its linguistic
and ethnic identity" (1989, 26).
This equilibrium was disturbed, however, during the 1830s when the liberals at-

tempted to impose a centralized government
on Spain. Nevertheless, during this time
Catalunya's economic strength was unequaled, she experienced a cultural renaissance,
her language was used in literature and
science, her citizens studied her history, a
pride in her traditional institutions emerged,
and a fervent nationalism created the desire
for autonomy. Autonomy came in 1932 but
it was rescinded shortly after Franco came
to power following the Spanish Civil War.
In addition, Franco prohibited the use of
Catalan in schools and books, declared that
cultural associations were illegal, and prohibited all Catalan cultural expressions. In
Catalunya during the Franco regime, this
fierce repression served only to "unite her
people in widespread opposition to a hated,
centralist regime" (Newton 1983, 109) and
to "reinforce the desire of the Catalans to
regain their autonomy" (Moxon-Browne
1989, 48). In the post-Franco era, Catalunya pushed for autonomy and, in the
Constitution of 1978, was one of the first
three regions to achieve it. In this way
alone she was different than the majority of
the other regions of Spain.
However, Catalunya's distinctiveness
with the rest of Spain goes much deeper
than her history. Her citizens just simply
feel different than and separate from their
fellow Spaniards. A New York Times article
dated 26 September 1989 described the
Catalans in the following way:
Hard working, prosperous and deeply proud of
their Catalan language and culture, the people of
Barcelona Spain make no secret of their belief that
their city's selection as the site for the 1992 Olympic Games is further proof that they are just a
touch superior to other Spaniards.

According to Moxon-Browne, the superiority that the Catalans feel is based on "past
history, linguistic distinctiveness, and a
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feeling of being different from the Castilian
majority in Spain" (1989, 49). This feeling
is demonstrated more clearly in appendix
two which shows that nearly 40 percent of
the citizens of Catalunya feel more Catalan
than they do Spanish. In other words, they
identify more with their region than with
their nation. Another poll among young
people in Barcelona in 1984 showed the
same results. Moxon-Browne declares that
"27 percent said they felt 'only Catalan' and
a further 16 percent felt more 'Catalan than
Spanish'" (1989, 48). Furthermore, the
Catalans define their identity in terms of
their language and culture instead of in
terms of the Spanish culture and the Castilian language (Gunther, Sani, and Shabad
1988, 319). Because of this regional nationalism and immense pride in their culture and
their history, many Catalans would like to
see an independent state (19 percent in the
1984 poll) and most would like to receive
more autonomy from the central government. This is shown clearly by the end
result of the 1984 elections in which the
foremost nationalist party, the CiU, won an
absolute majority in the parliament with
46.6 per cent of the vote. Since 64.4 per
cent of the voters went to the polls, it is
obvious that many of the Catalan people
support their regional parties and government (Moxon-Browne 1989, 49). (Further
information on the percentages of Catalan
support for more autonomy is available in
appendix three). Therefore, although the
Catalan region most likely will not separate
from Spain in the near future, the presence
of a desire for more autonomy or for independence will be a continual threat to the
nation-state of Spain in the years to come.
Regionalist nationalism and distinctiveness is manifested by the pride of the Catalans in their language. The Catalans believe that theirs is a "language of culture,

with an important literature and a significant
number of scientific works published" (Coverdale 1979, 23-24). The language, Catalan, is a mixture of French and Spanish.
Throughout Catalunya everything is written
in this language primarily and then the
Castilian language follows. Conversations
on the street are normally held in Catalan.
In addition, and this is true in many other
areas of Spain, the greatest majority of
citizens speak their regional language at
home and over half speak it regularly in the
workplace. In fact, "language is clearly a
badge of Catalan identity: those who do not
speak it find jobs difficult to get and the
pressure to learn the language and become
integrated into Catalan society is therefore
almost irresistible" (Moxon-Browne 1989,
49). In other words, in order to preserve
their culture, the Catalans not only use
Catalan in their homes but also they force
the immigrant community to learn the language and customs and, therefore, to be
Catalanized (Gunther, Sani and Shabad
1988, 319).
The Catalans probably would not have
such a dramatic influence over the immigrants in their region if they did not have
such a strong economy. Immigrants come
from regions allover Spain to take advantage of the monetary rewards to be had in
the industrial and service sectors of the
booming Catalan economy. Not only does
this economy provide jobs to Spaniards but
it also contributes a large percentage of
revenue to the Spanish government. Therefore, it is important to the continued vitality
of the Spanish state. The Catalans realize
their vital role and take pride in their economic prowess. This economic prowess,
for some, is an encouraging factor on the
road to separatism because they believe that
Catalunya is strong enough to survive as an
independent state. Others also justify sepa-
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ration based on economic prowess but for a
different reason. These Catalans believe
that they have been the victims of economic
discrimination at the hands of the central
government because of the "inegalitarian
impact of Spanish taxation and spending
policies. . . . Nationalist leaders have long
maintained that revenues derived from the
Basque area and Catalunya [to be used for
the development of the poorer areas of
Spain] have far exceeded the value of public
services received by them" (Gunther, Sani,
and Shabad 1988, 325). Therefore, pride in
their economic prowess, culture, language,
and history and feelings of economic discrimination playa major role in the justification by many Catalans of increased autonomy and/or separation from the Spanish
state.

The Basque Country

The Basque country is a region of Spain
which borders France to the west, the Bay
of Biscay to the north, los Montes Cantabricos to the east and small mountains to
the south. Because it is at the most northern
point of the Iberian peninsula, the Basque
country, like Catalunya, has been relatively
isolated throughout a large part of her history. As a result, her history has been distinct
from that of the rest of Spain.
At the time of the formation of the
Spanish state by the Catholic kings, the
provinces of the Basque country had already
belonged to the crown of Castile for several
centuries. According to Moxon-Browne, the
Basques had been allowed to use fueros,
local statutes, since the seventh century
(1989, 51). In addition, they had been
allowed to retain "their local customs, institutions, and languages throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centu-

ries" (Coverdale 1979, 32) in exchange for
their allegiance to Castile and their use of
the Castilian language in both government
and culture. Because of this arrangement,
the centralization of the Spanish state did not
affect the Basque country as terribly as it
did Catalunya. During the nineteenth century, the Basque country was able to pursue
regionalist policies and soon became the
center of Spanish heavy industry and mining. As a result, the Basques were able to
participate even more effectively in the
economic and political life of Spain.
Basque autonomy was first challenged
and eradicated when the liberals came to
power in the early nineteenth century. The
jueros were abolished in 1876 and customs
posts on the Ebro were removed. Because
of this, the Basques lost "an important
symbol and component of economic autonomy" (Moxon-Browne 1989,51). In order to
reassert their independence, the Basques
formed a nationalist party (PNV) in 1895
under the tutelage of Sabina de Arana. This
party was based on a close identification
with the Catholic church and a desire for
ethnic purity, especially in the wake of the
immigration brought on by the Basque
illdustrialization process. The nationalist
party renamed the Basque country Euskadi,
made a new flag, and encouraged people to
speak the Basque language. Although it did
not receive much popular support initially,
it became the forerunner to the intensely
Basque nationalist party of today, the ETA.
The ETA (Euskadi ta askatasuna) was
originally a simple nationalist movement in
the 1950s. It began in response to the
repressive policies pursued by the Franco
dictatorship.
Franco had deprived the
Basque provinces of their economic and
administrative autonomy, prohibited the use
and teaching of the Basque language, burned
Basque books, forbidden Basque musical

..
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instruments and the wearing of the Basque
national colors, removed the Basque language from tombstones and public buildings,
and Castilianized all names and inscriptions.
In response to this, the ETA organized and
dedicated itself to the independence of the
Basque country from Spain.
When it was first organized, the ETA
did not advocate violence as an acceptable
method of achieving change. However, the
organization soon committed itself to armed
struggle (1967) in response to the Francoist
tactics it had to combat. Since 1968, over
600 murders of Spanish public officials and
police officers have been committed in the
name of regionalist nationalism (The Christian Science Monitor, January 31, 1989).
ETA has justified its actions on the grounds
that it must raise consciousness among the
Basque people, protect the people against
the repressive apparatus of the central government, and confront the government in the
only language it understands (MoxonBrowne 1989, 55). Not even the concessions made in the Constitution of 1978 have
stemmed the terrorist activities. Actually,
the transition to democracy was accompanied by an "increase of violence--from 29
deaths in 1977, to 88 in 1978, to 131 in
1979" (Gunther, Sani, and Shabad 1988,
246). In 1988 alone, nineteen people were
killed (Washington Post, February 26,
1989). Even though the ETA called a selfimposed truce for two months during 1989,
the violence will probably not cease until the
Basque country is granted independence
from Spain. Although support for ETA's
violent tactics is not widespread in the
Basque country (only 42 percent of the
extreme nationalists and 9 percent of the
more moderate group sympathize with
ETA), the organization does reflect the
sentiments of a large section of the Basque

population who want more autonomy or
independence at any cost.
The desire for Basque independence is
so strong (as shown in appendix three)
because of the intense regionalist nationalism
which is prevalent there among certain
groups. This nationalism can be attributed
to many factors, one of which is the influx
into the Basque country of non-Basque
immigrants and businessmen who have
created social upheaval and have diluted the
ethnic purity of the Basque people. Therefore, the Basques desire to disassociate
themselves from further ethnic contamination through independence. Moreover, the
Basque nationalist ideology is based on a
"dedication to the Catholic faith, the belief
that all Basques should be united across the
Pyrenees, and the assertion that language
should be the defining characteristic of the
Basque race" (Moxon-Browne 1989, 52).
Again, regionalist supporters assert that
independence or more autonomy would aid
the Basques in achieving these nationalistic
goals.
Another reason for their separatist desires is that many Basques do not consider
themselves to be Spaniards at all. Appendix
two shows that at least half of the Basque
people do not readily associate themselves
with the Spaniards. Instead, the Basques
"rest their claim to autonomy on their ethnic, cultural and, above all, linguistic distinctiveness" (Newton 1983, 112) from the
rest of Spain. In other words, they believe
they are a separate ethnic group whose
language is an obvious manifestation of this.
In reality, there is some truth to their assertions. The Basque language is distinct in
that its origins are unknown and it has no
connection with any other European language. Because of this, the Basques are
able to guard the purity of their language
and, with it, create a barrier for the mixing
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of foreign blood with the ethnic purity of
their race. Therefore, their language is an
important factor in their struggle for autonomy, independence, and ethnic purity.
Another important factor is their economic prowess. Like Catalunya, the Basque
country is one of the more developed regions of Spain. Therefore, it can be reasonably confident that, were it to gain its independence, it would be able to survive on its
own. It too rallies around the idea of economic discrimination by the central government in its justification for separatism. Like
Catalunya, it pays nearly a third of all taxes
and receives only a small percentage of
services in return. Therefore, pride in their
economic prowess, culture, language, and
history and feelings of economic discrimination playa major role in the justification by
many Basques of separation from the Spanish state.

Other Reeions
Although the separatist or autonomist fervor
in other regions is not nearly so pronounced
as it is in Catalunya and the Basque country,
regionalist sentiments do exist elsewhere in
Spain. During the drafting of the Constitution of 1978,
preferences for varying degrees of autonomy and
even for independence, as well as support for
regional parties, were present in other culturally
and linguistically distinct regions, such as Navarra,
Valencia, the Balearic Islands, Andalucfa and the
Canary Islands [who had] no previous aspirations
for, or historical experiences with, self-government
(Gunther, Sani, and Shabad, 382).

For example, one of the most startling
results of the 1979 election was the success
of the Partido Socialista de Andalucfa
(PSA). This party received 11 percent of

the vote in Andalucfa and obtained five out
of the fifty-nine seats allotted to the region.
"The meteoric rise of the PSA was the most
dramatic instance of the spread of demands
for autonomy in Castilian-speaking and
indisputably 'Spanish' regions of the country" (Gunther, Sani, and Shabad 1988,383).
Support in the other regions for more autonomy and/or independence can be found in
appendix three. Although most regions at
this time do not advocate independence,
many at least want limited autonomy from
the central government. After experiencing
the ability to control their own affairs it is
possible that more regions will advocate
greater autonomy in the future, especially if
concessions are made in the Basque country
and Catalunya.
The desires for autonomy in other regions are based on various factors. First,
the existence of various languages other than
Castilian, such as Gallego Portuguese,
Andaluciano, Valenciano, etc., encourages
an association with a region instead of with
the state. Next, the geographical features
which cut across the Iberian peninsula have
isolated various regions from one another
and, as a result, have resulted in distinct
peoples with distinct histories. The historical differences are compounded by the
cultural influences each region has had (such
as the Arabs who settled southern Spain as
opposed to the Romans, Christians, and
Europeans who settled northern Spain).
Furthermore, the economic discrimination
which the poorer regions have suffered at
the hands of the larger regions, especially
under internal colonialism, has created a
fierce loyalty to oppressed regions. And,
finally, the historical lack of control over
their own affairs has made many Spanish
citizens desire more regional autonomy or
independence. Each of these factors plays a
certain role in the regionalist sentiment of
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each area of the peninsula. Although this
sentiment is not as pronounced in the other
regions and those who strive for autonomy
may be in the minority, regionalist sentiment
of whatever degree or intensity is dangerous
to the continued existence of the Spanish
state.

The Central Government's Response
To assert the overall authority of the state,
the Spanish government declared in the
Constitution of 1978 that Castilian was the
official language of the state and that all
Spaniards must know and use it. In addition, the central administration has been
very protective of the rights guaranteed it by
the constitution and has refused to grant
more concessions to the regions (for example, it refuses to negotiate with the ETA
separatists in the Basque country). To
discourage further separatist fervor the
Spanish Parliament has passed anti-terrorist
legislation which gives the police the right to
search homes of suspected ETA members
without a warrant and to intercept mail and
telephone conversations (Moxon-Browne
1989, 57-58). In addition, the government
has offered amnesty to those individuals who
will agree in writing to renounce terrorism.
These are a few of the tactics the central
government is presently using to quell the
regionalist nationalism that is plaguing the
Spanish state. However, all the evidence
shows that "the process of devolving political power to the regions is far from complete and daunting problems remain to be
surmounted" (Donaghy and Newton 1987,
117).
First, the central government needs to
decide whether it wants a centralized, federal, or disunified governmental system. If it
is not moving in the direction it desires, it

should act accordingly. Regardless of which
system the centralized government chooses,
creative choices and innovative policies are
required to ensure that the system is successful. For example, Lancaster suggests
that the government lower the costs of
staying with Spain for the highly separatist
areas, such as the Basque country, through
tax incentives (1987, 586). Whether or not
the government considers this solution to be
valid, it will soon need to come up with
ideas of its own in order to win the war of
devolution.
In addition to this, the government must
impose limits to the autonomy of regions.
Granting autonomous powers "may mean
yielding some of the powers which central
authorities themselves believe to be necessary to the uniform provision of effective
government" (Moxon-Browne, 64). Already,
a sense of identification with the Spanish state is
intersected by strong ties of allegiance to regional
governments. The concept of the Spanish nation
inevitability risks being further diluted as voters
look to regional governments for bread-and-butter
services, and to regional flags and other symbols
for expressions of cultural distinctiveness (MoxonBrowne, 63).

This problem is further exacerbated if the
regional government, like that of Catalunya,
provides superior services than those provided by the central government. If the central
government does not move quickly to assert
its influence in some way over its citizens in
the various regions, it will soon be thought
of as an incapable and outmoded institution.
This process could take time but it will
eventually lead to the total devolution of the
Spanish state.
Second, the government must decide
how it will be able financially to handle the
process of devolution which seems to be
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occurring. Paying for eighteen separate
governments instead of only one is a very
expensive proposition and will require much
forethought. In addition, Newton believes
that a major financial test of the current
system will be the ability of the central
government to,
tackle the serious economic problems faced by
regions like Andalusia, Galicia, Extremadura, and
Castile while not alienating the richer areas like the
Basque Country, Catalunya, Asturias and Cantabria
which will be obliged to contribute to their development through the Interterritorial Compensation
Fund (125).

This will be a difficult task considering the
fierce resentment of the economically advanced regions toward this system.
Finally, the government must decide
how to deal with the lack of solidarity that
exists between the differing regions which,
at this point, threatens the continuance of the
Spanish state. This problem is obvious in
the constant fighting between the Basques
and the central government and in the resentment of the Basque country and Catalunya to the uneven distribution of services
under the Interterritorial Compensation
Fund. Furthermore, interregional problems
could occur between those regions who
believe that they deserve preferential treatment because of their history and ethnicity,
such as the Basque country and Catalunya,
and those regions which are created simply
because of geographical factors. The central
government must devise a plan to ensure
equality while, at the same time, abating the
cries for preferential treatment (Donaghy
and Newton 1987, 118). This, like all the
other issues which need to be addressed,
will be difficult to solve but it is vital to the
survival of the current governmental system
and the continuance of the modern state of
Spain.

Conclusion
Although the problems I have just considered bode ill for the continuance of the
Spanish state, the regionalist nationalistic
sentiments by no means guarantee the total
devolution of Spain. First, these sentiments
do not necessarily represent the viewpoints
of every citizen of Spain. In fact, in certain
areas those with regionalistic sentiments are
in the minority. For many others, a strong
sense of state nationalism and pride in Espana exists which eclipses the regional
nationalism. Second, despite varied cultures
and histories, all Spaniards share certain
experiences and elements of their culture
with all other Spaniards. Ironically, argues
Newton, one of the most prevalent characteristics common to all Spaniards is precisely their tendency to separatism. In other
words, the more separatist a Catalan, a
Basque, or an Andalucian is, the more
Spanish he reveals himself to be. (1983,
127) If citizens focus more on the ties they
have with their neighbors than on the ways
in which they are different, this common
culture could be the saving grace of the
Spanish state. Finally, all regions must be
willing to compromise. The Castilians must
renounce the idea that the nation was created
only by them and must, instead, accept the
specific contributions of each region. It
must also be willing to accept a more decentralized and diverse state. On the other
hand, the regions, while enjoying their
autonomy, must remember to demonstrate
their loyalty to the whole, and must temper
their own demands so as to achieve what is
in the best interest for everyone involved.
If many of these things do not happen, Spain
as we know it will soon disintegrate into a
collection of economically strong regional
states and a unified nation comprised of
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economically backward entities. If many
of these important changes are made, Spain

as a unified state will continue to rule effectively for centuries to come.
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Early Childhood Education:
A Viable Defense Against Poverty
by
Kristin Sandberg

Introduction

In 1988, 13 percent of the United States
population fell below the official poverty
line (U.S. Department of Commerce 1990,
458). Twenty percent of the children in this
nation grow up in poverty conditions (460),
frequently without adequate food and shelter. These figures are actually higher than
those during the 1970s, which suggests that
we are losing the "war on poverty."
Most federal poverty programs provide
income maintenance. Unemployment insurance, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and Social Security grant a monthly
stipend to those whose incomes place them
below the official poverty line. These
programs do not, however, address the
causes of poverty; they only sustain the
individual marginally above an arbitrary
"poverty line." We have not been able

terminate poverty because we do not fully
understand its causes.
Brian Jones, doctor of sociology at Villanova University, asserts that we will never
have an effective poverty policy until we
determine a logical theory for the causes of
poverty. We cannot solve a problem we do
not understand. Jones observes that "since
we have no verified theory of why particular
people are poor, it follows ... that policy
'cures' will be poorly informed" (1984,
247). He also interprets the general lack of
support for anti-poverty programs: "contemporary public perceptions of the 'welfare
mess' reflect a hodgepodge of programs
lacking a coherent rationale, and thus lacking any compelling reason for funding"
(247). While we quibble about funding and
theories, 31,878,000 Americans suffer the
effects of poverty (U.S. Department of
Commerce 1990, 460).
What actually causes poverty? Many
Americans believe that poverty results from
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individual characteristics, such as laziness,
and that the individual is solely to blame
(Smith and Stone 1989, 101). This is not
necessarily true. Family composition, race,
and education are three of the greatest determinants of poverty. Families with single
parents are three times more likely to be
poor than families where both parents are
present. Blacks are twice as likely to be
poor than whites (patterson, Kupersmidt,
and Vaden 1990, 488). Over 60 percent of
those who did not graduate from high school
are poor (U.S. Department of Commerce
1990, 461).
Family composition and race are variables which neither the individual nor the
government can control. It is also true that
in some cases the poor cannot control the
amount of education they receive. However, when it comes to education, the federal
government can and should intervene. The
United States government should sponsor
large-scale early education programs for
low-income children because it will significantly increase academic ability, educational
attainment, and economic well-being among
the poor.

Links Between Education and Poverty
Educational Attainment
In many cases, the poor are poor because
they have little education, and without education they cannot find jobs that pay well.
A recent study showed that, except for race,
education was the greatest determinant of
poverty (Taylor and Chatters 1988, 439).
Statistics from the U.S. Bureau of the Census confirm this finding, as shown in Table
1. In 1988, the unemployment rate was 9.6
percent for high school drop-outs, 5.4 percent for high school graduates, 3.7 percent

for college dropouts, and 1.7 percent for
college graduates (U.S. Department of
Commerce 1990, 397). The mean annual
income for high school drop-outs was
$16,727, $25,910 for high school graduates,
$31,865 for college dropouts, and $43,952
for college graduates (445). Clearly, more
education equals less unemployment and
higher income.
Christopher Jencks and his colleagues at
the Harvard Center for Educational Research concur with the Commerce Department's findings. Their research revealed
that graduating from high school raises
income 40 percent while graduating from
college raises income 49 percent (1979,
182). However, the poor, those who would
benefit most from additional education, do
not receive it. Over 60 percent of the poor
in the United States did not graduate from
high school (U.S. Department of Commerce
1990, 461).
Perhaps the federal government should
simply require college graduation for all
citizens as a way to significantly reduce
poverty. But, further analysis demonstrates
that this approach could never work. In
many instances, the poor do not pursue
more education because they face significant
sociological and economic barriers. We
cannot simply require that they pursue more
years of schooling. We must first understand and address these educational barriers
so that the poor will be able to attain more
education. These barriers originate in the
family and begin hindering the poor in their
early childhood.

Family Background
Being raised in an impoverished family often
reduces educational achievement due to
several sociological factors. The poor lack
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Table 1
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNEMPLOYMENT, INCOME AND EDUCATION
(1988)
UNEMPWYMENT
RATE

MEAN ANNUAL
INCOME

HIGH SCHOOL
DROPOUTS

9.6%

$16,727

HIGH SCHOOL
GRADUATES

5.4%

$25,910

COLLEGE
DROPOUTS

3.7%

$31,865

COLLEGE
GRADUATES

1.7%

$43,952

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Statistical Abstract of the
United States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
1990.

basic necessities such as clothing, food, and
shelter which results in a high stress level
for parents. A parent preoccupied with
survival does not have as much time, energy, or attention to focus on the upbringing
or education of children. Patterson, Kupersmidt, and Vaden observe that children
raised in such stressful environments often
suffer from short attention spans and emotional difficulties (1990, 491). These children frequently begin public school with
emotional and educational handicaps.
Christopher Ruhm, an economist from
Boston University, explains the economic
reasons why poor children attain less education. He hypothesizes that the cost of education rises as personal income falls. Thus,
education is actually cheaper for the nonpoor than for the poor. First, poor parents
contribute less money to their children's

educations. Second, they spend less time
training their children at home. Third, they
have fewer educational resources at home,
such as books, encyclopedias, and computers. Fourth, poor parents do not exhibit
certain marketable skills which other parents
exhibit and pass on to their children (Ruhm
1988, 157). It is more difficult and more
costly for poor children to become educated
than for other children.
Christopher Jencks and his colleagues
agree that family background influences
income level and educational attainment.
They discovered that "being white, having a
mother or father with a lot of schooling,
having a father with a high-status occupation, having parents with high incomes, and
coming from a small family all enhance a
son's economic prospects" (1979, 60). In
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the study, families with these characteristics
were defined as "advantaged families."
Jencks elaborates:
We concluded that family background as a whole
explained about 48 percent of the variance in
occupational status and 15-35 percent of the variance in earnings among men in the early 1970s.
These estimates imply that those who do well
economically owe almost half of their occupational
advantage and 55-85 percent of their earnings
advantage to family background (81).

These studies show that, to some extent
wealth and poverty are passed from genera~
tion to generation.
Children from advantaged families tend
to have higher incomes because they are
more educated than poor children. In fact,
increased education accounts for 40-50
percent of the effect of family background
on earnings and 60-70 percent of its effect
on occupational status (Jencks and others
1979, 78). Children from advantaged families not only receive more education, but
they also seem to have higher levels of
cognitive and non-cognitive abilities such as
.
'
mter-personal skills, as well as higher career
aspirations than poor children. However,
even when researchers controlled for differences in ability, education, and occupation,
Jencks still found that people from advantaged families have higher incomes than
those from poor families (70-71).

Academic Ability

Another reason that low-income children
attain less education than middle-income
children is that they perform at lower levels
in school. Charlotte Patterson, Janis Kupersmidt, and Nancy Vaden conducted a study
of elementary school children and established that those from low income families
tended to have lower academic achievement

as well as more behavior and peer relationship problems (1990, 490). Most researchers recognize that low-income children both
perform more poorly in school and receive
less education than wealthier peers.
Christopher Jencks analyzed eleven
studies of American men and determined
that those who perform at lower achievement levels in school have lower levels of
economic success as adults. High school
students who scored lower on standardized
achievement tests received lower status jobs
with lower incomes than those that scored
higher (1979, 85). A fifteen point difference on standardized tests corresponded to a
30 percent decrease in income (220). The
fact that low scorers pursue fewer years of
schooling accounts for 60 to 80 percent of
this income difference (112).
Students who score well on tests receive
more encouragement to attain additional
education and have higher ambitions. They
"have more discussions with teachers, more
parental encouragement, and higher aspirations among their peers than low-scoring
individuals" (Jencks and others 1979, 108).
These students are more likely to have
friends that are going to college, parents that
~ant them to go to college, and thus, ambitions to go to college. In short, students
who perform well on tests receive more
income largely because these students pursue
more years of schooling than their lowscoring peers (104).
From early childhood, poor children are
handicapped by sociological, economic, and
academic barriers which limit their opportunity to receive an education. Due to this
educational disadvantage, poor children will
grow up to be poor adults. Their children
will also grow up in poverty and suffer the
same educational disadvantage. As a result
of this intergenerational cycle, the poor,
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those who most need an education, are least
able to get it.
One study theorizes that education is
twice as valuable from an economic standpoint to the poor than to the non-poor (Cohen and Tyree 1986, 812). Yet, children of
the poor are only half as likely as children
of the non-poor to go on to college (808).
The poor need help. Unaided, it is nearly
impossible for them to escape from this
intergenerational cycle of educational disadvantage.

Benefits of Preschool Education
Numerous studies over the last thirty years
have revealed that early childhood education
for poor children can compensate for the
socialization and education that they do not
receive at home and thereby reduce "inequality for disadvantaged families" (Ruhm
1988, 162). Poor children enrolled in preschool learn cognitive and non-cognitive
skills such as "attentiveness to teachers,
ability to follow instructions, and task perseverance. " They are better prepared to
compete with their wealthier peers in the
classroom and have a more positive attitude
toward school generally.
This positive
attitude perpetuates itself, causing the students to have a much more successful "public school experience" (Lazar and Darlington
1982, 64). They then pursue more education, which r.;sults in higher income. The
federal government must provide this education because the poor cannot afford it themselves.

most significant studies is the Perry Preschool Project which was conducted by the
High/Scope Educational Research Foundation. In 1962 a large sample of poor, black,
3-year-olds began a two year preschool
program. The preschool continued for five
years, and new children were enrolled as the
older ones graduated to kindergarten. The
children were tested both during and after
the preschool experience and compared on a
number of tests to children in the control
group who did not go to preschool. Although the children received no further
experimental education after age five, the
researchers followed them through their
educational careers and tested their abilities
compared to those in the control group.
The most recent results were published in
1984 when the children were 19 years old
(see Table 2). The original subjects are
now 25 years old, and data is currently
being gathered for the next publication
which is expected within the year (Berrueta-Clement and others 1984).
Another significant analysis was performed by Irving Lazar and Richard Darlington of the Consortium for Longitudinal
Studies. They organized a collaboration of
twelve separate researchers who performed
independent preschool studies in the 1960s.
In 1976 they pooled their original data and
did a follow-up analysis of the children in
all twelve studies, including the Perry project (1982). Both the Perry project and the
Lazar-Darlington investigation established
the benefits of preschool for the poor.

Family Background

Significant Studies
Several studies of preschool programs have
been conducted in order to establish their
advantage to poor children. One of the

Preschool not only changed the lives of the
students, but also the lives of their parents.
Lazar and Darlington found that the mothers
of preschool students reported feeling much
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more satisfied with their children's school
success than non-preschool moms, even in
those cases where the children actually did
not perform better. The preschool moms
also had much higher aspirations for their
children's futures. "This suggests that early
education may have affected the familial
context with respect to achievement orientation" explain Lazar and Darlington (1982,
54). Preschool children are more likely to
be encouraged by their parents and, therefore, more likely to do better in school.

level as their middle-income peers, while
poor children in the control group begin
with a significant disadvantage. Preschool
gives these disadvantaged children the headstart they desperately need. Even if the
initial IQ gains disappear, the long term
effects of positive attitude and personal
achievement have already determined a
course of success that the children will
follow.

Educational Attainment
Academic Ability
The educational literature concurs that a
well-run preschool will raise the IQ of
disadvantaged children during the course of
the program (Lazar and Darlington 1982,
44). The IQ gains of the experimental
group over the control group are consistently significant three to five years after preschool ends. Most studies show that IQ
differences level off by age ten to seventeen;
however, these studies all relied on IQ
testing performed by the schools, which
often yields biased results. The Perry study
administered IQ testing in a standardized,
laboratory setting, and it demonstrated that
IQ gains continued throughout high school.
Lazar and Darlington contend that the Perry
project, which was conducted by David
Weikart, is the most reliable study (1982,
43).
Low-income preschool students enter
kindergarten not only with significantly
higher IQ levels than those who received no
early education, but also with markedly
increased learning and adapting skills. They
are already acquainted with a classroom
situation and have a more positive attitude
towards school. Studies reveal that they
enter school at nearly the same competence

Low-income children placed in preschool
are less likely to have failure experiences at
school. Lazar and Darlington found that
while 28.6 percent of low-income students
are placed in special education programs,
only 13.8 percent of poor children who went
to preschool were placed in special education. Preschool children were also significantly less likely to be held back a grade
(1982, 55). Lazar and Darlington affirm
that "early education significantly improved
the ability of low-income children to meet
their schools' requirements for adequate
performance, as reflected in reduced rates of
assignment to special educational and retention in grade" (55). Even when the researchers controlled for the before-preschool
IQ level and the family background of the
children, preschool children still had an
"improved competence rate of 16 percent."
As Lazar and Darlington proclaim, "Any
effort that positively affects the lives of 16
percent of participants would appear to be
educationally worthwhile" (57).
Students who must repeat a grade or
who are enrolled in special education are
much more likely to drop out of high school
(Lazar and Darlington 1982, 58). When
placed in special education or held back,
they are frequently labeled "emotionally
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Table 2
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF CIDLDREN IN THE PERRY PROJECT
(1984)
NO PRESCHOOL

PRESCHOOL

GRADUATED FROM
mGHSCHOOL

49%

67%

PURSUED ACADEMIC
POSTSECONDARY
EDUCATION

13%

19%

PURSUED
VOCATIONAL
POST-SECONDARY
EDUCATION

10%

19%

Source: Berrueta-Clement, John R., Lawrence J. Scheinhart, W. Steven Barnett, Ann S.
Epstein, and David P. Weikart. Changed Lives: The Effects o/the Perry Preschool Program
on Youths Through Age 19. Ypsilant, Michigan: High/Scope Educational Research Foundation, 1984. p. 31.

disturbed" or "mentally retarded" and suffer
from feelings of low self-worth. Also,
Lazar and Darlington note that their low
performance levels place them on slower
learning tracks, which limits their educational opportunities. As we have seen, through
preschool attendance, low-income children
can avoid these scenarios and have a much
greater chance of success. Children who
succeed in high school are much more likely
to go on to college.
As illustrated in Table 2, the Perry
project researchers found that 67 percent of
preschool students graduated from high
school compared to only 49 percent of nonpreschoolers. Nationally, only 60 percent of
black youth graduate from high school; thus,

preschool raised the percentage for disadvantaged blacks above the national level
(Berrueta-Clement and others 1984, 30-31).
Nineteen percent of preschool children
pursued academic post-secondary education
compared to 13 percent in the control group.
Another 19 percent of preschoolers pursued
vocational post-secondary training, compared to only 10 percent of non-preschoolers
(31). "Preschool helped study participants
overcome some of the disadvantages of
coming from lower-income families and of
being more educationally vulnerable than the
national black population" (30).
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Table 3
AVERAGE UNEMPLOYMENT, INCOME, AND FINANCIAL STANDING OF PERRY
PROIECT CHILDREN AT AGE 19
(1984)
NO PRESCHOOL

PRESCHOOL

EMPWYED

32%

50%

MONTHS OF
UNEMPWYMENT
SINCE GRADUATION

10.3

4.9

$1100

$2800

HAD SOME SAVINGS

48%

62%

FINANCIALLY
INDEPENDENT

25%

45%

RECEIVING
WELFARE

32%

18%

ANNUAL INCOME

Source: Berrueta-Clement, Iohn R., Lawrence I. Scheinhart, W. Steven Barnett, Ann S.
Epstein, and David P. Weikart. Changed Lives: The Effects of the Perry Preschool Program
on Youths Through Age 19. Ypsilant, Michigan: High/Scope Educational Research Foundation, 1984. p. 49.

Economic Gains
As we would expect, this educational advantage leads to a direct economic advantage:
less poverty. Since low-income children
who receive early education perform better
in school and receive more education, they
have more success in the job market and
earn higher incomes. At age nineteen, 50
percent of the Perry Preschool children were
employed, while only 32 percent of their
non-preschool peers were employed (see
Table 3). On the average, those with early
education had been unemployed for 4.9

months since high school graduation compared to 10.3 months of unemployment for
the control group. These employment figures translate into an annual income of
$2800 for the study group and $1100 for the
control group (Berrueta-Clement and others
1984, 46).
Preschool not only contributed to financial success, but it also contributed to financial independence. Sixty-two percent of the
preschool children had saved some money
by age nineteen. Only 48 percent of their
counterparts had saved any money (Berrueta-Clement and others 1984,51). Nearly
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half of these children were financially independent at age nineteen, compared to onefourth of the others (50).
Perhaps most astonishing is the fact that,
at age nineteen, 32 percent of the low-income children who received no preschool
had received some form of public assistance,
averaging $1509 per person (excluding
unemployment insurance and social security). However, just 18 percent of the children who had preschool education had
received welfare payments, averaging only
$633 per person (Berrueta-Clement and
others 1984, 50). In welfare payments
alone, two years of early education saved
society nearly $1000 per person. The Perry
researchers assure, "the weight of evidence
and the trends over time suggest that the
effect will increase in succeeding years"
(54).
When the gross economic benefits are
totaled (including increased lifetime savings,
school district savings due to less special
education, and the release time of parents
while their children were in preschool), the
Perry Preschool Project grossed a 248 percent return on its investment (Lazar and
Darlington 1982,58). This does not include
the value of decreased human suffering from
poverty and increased human satisfaction
from personal achievement.

Conclusion
In order to combat poverty in an effective,
efficient manner, the federal government
must establish early education programs for

low-income children on a massive scale.
Early education for low-income children will
improve academic ability, increase educational attainment, raise income, and help to
break the intergenerational cycle of poverty.
Lazar and Darlington observe how preschool, with "relatively few inputs, a few
hours a day for one to two years," without
significant post study follow-through, can
have statistically significant educational and
economic impacts (1982, 58). The overall
improvement was so great because several
interrelated variables, such as IQ, academic
ability, non-cognitive skills, and attitude,
were influenced (59).
When implementing this program on the
national level, we must remember that the
laboratory preschools were academicall y
oriented and had low student-teacher ratios.
A successful federal preschool should incorporate these same variables. However, the
lab preschools were flexible and will allow
some variation. Another consideration is
that
these were voluntary programs in which the
parents desired to participate (Lazar and
Darlington 1982,59). Perhaps a mandatory
system would accrue slightly different results.
Certainly more research and careful
planning are needed in order to insure that
the most effective federal preschools are
established. However, the evidence clearly
demands that early education be provided
for low-income children now. Earlyeducation will not eradicate poverty, but it will
undoubtedly curtail the suffering of the

poor.
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Founding a Republic of Laws:
The Rule of Law Ideal in Early American Constitutional Theory
by
Robert Moye

Introduction
Although there is a wealth of scholarship
available on the political and constitutional
theories of the American Founders, many
commentaries overlook or misunderstand
one of the most important elements in the
Framers' thought: their desire to implement
the rule of law ideal into the new national
government. Much of this confusion may
be attributed to contemporary disagreement
about what the rule of law actually implies,
and the remainder to a mistaken belief of
what the term meant for the Founders. In
current parlance, the term suggests only a
minimal equality--that no person should be
"above the law"--but the concept meant a
great deal more to the Founders.
During the nation's formative years,
American statesmen had a clear conception
of what the term "the rule of law" meant to
classical thinkers, as well as the ideal's

contemporary implications. Their constitutional experiment attempted, among other
things, to minimize the tendency toward
arbitrary government by incorporating the
rule of law ideal in their governing institutions and procedures. While most scholars
recognize the great care with which the
Founders refashioned the nation's authoritative institutions, they often ignore important
procedural aspects of constitutional theory;
some even exacerbate this mistake by dismissing certain of the Constitutions' procedural innovations as unsophisticated.
Fortunately, some scholars avoid such
errors. Noting the enormous difference
between rule by established legal procedures
and rule by an unpredictable human will,
George and Scarlett Graham observe that:
Underlying each principle, institution, and practice
explored by the Founders was one basic presupposition that was unchallenged by any theory of
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experience brought to their deliberations: the
government to be founded must be a government of
law rather than of men. (1977, xiii)

In this paper, I will attempt to show that the
American Founders' constitutional theories
were influenced by their perceptions of the
rule of law ideal and its procedural implications. I do not argue that the Founders were
uninspired by other sources (i.e. classical
economics, protestant religion, civic virtue,
or their faith in "enlightened" reason), but
rather that this type of explanation offers, at
best, only an incomplete picture of the
Founder's intentions. A truer picture of the
Framers' motivations must also include their
commitment to the rule of law ideal and its
traditional emphasis on legal procedures.
To liberal statesmen living before and
during the Founding era, there seemed to be
a fairly obvious, necessary connection between the rule of law and the legitimacy of
a government. Although they rarely employed the phrase "rule of law," they made
frequent references to the ideal and its
implications in a myriad of documented
discussions on the subject. The Founders
and their intellectual predecessors envisioned
the legal processes of any legitimate political
system as limited by certain procedural
norms implied by the rule of law ideal:
these included nulla poena sin lege (Usually
translated as "no punishment in the absence
of a crime"), due process, just compensa~on, trial by jury, the general and prospec~ve na~re of legal statutes, and the prohibition agamst ex post facto laws and bills of
attainder.
Given the Founders' commitment to
individual liberty, the line separating their
legal conventions from liberal political
theory often becomes tenuous or even
indiscernible. From the persp~tive of the
Framers, the legal process itself reflected an

informed political judgement on the value of
procedure. In fact, the rule of law has been
described as a political ideal which defines
~e nature of law itself and imposes limitations on government (Hayek 1960, 206).
Sor:ne modern commentators dispute this
claIm; but, for the Founders, the notion of
the rule of law was a legal ideal which
informed the time-honored procedures ordering a free society.

The Ori&ins and Development of an Ideal
The philosophers of ancient Greece and
Rome were among the first to formulate the
concrete implications of what later came to
be called "the rule of law." In his 1960
work ~ Constitution of Liberty, Austrian
economIst F. A. Hayek challenged the
pr~vailing ass~mption that ancient political
phIlosophy rejected an individualistic conception of personal liberty . He insisted that,
for many Greeks, government by legal
p~~u~es (which he calls isonomia) , as
dIStingUIshed from human will or caprice
entailed certain conditions. Those stan:
dards, as described by the lawgiver Solon,
were that 1) all citizens, regardless of class,
would share the same laws, and 2) that the
government would abide by known and
certain rules (Hayek 1960, 165). Hayek
further argued that many Greeks even preferred government by isonomia over demokratia, or equal participation, because established legal procedures protected their freedom (165). For the Greeks then, a free
government was a government of law, since
legal procedures, by definition, placed
limitations on the exercise of power in any
government that claimed legal sanction.
Spurred by the ancient Greeks most
liberal thinkers recognized that a l~w, as
opposed to a command or some other direc-
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tive, implied a certain generality of purpose
and prospectivity of scope (Wormuth 1949,
10). The equal, general, public, and prospective nature of human law suggested that
legal procedures, by definition, could serve
as an effective curb on sovereign caprice.
Equally important, while ill-suited to advance certain policy goals, the municipal
law could function as a facilitator for the
actions of an individual. In governments
which claimed to serve the people, the rule
of law ideal encouraged the rulers to restrain
their actions and protect the liberty of their
subjects. Even Plato, whom many commentators paint as a totalitarian, intimated that
"a primary function of government was to
protect and maintain the law of [and for] the
people" (Reynolds 1987, 83).
The influence of the classical rule of law
ideal was not wholly a Greek phenomena.
In ancient Rome, Cicero noted that freedom
should never be confused with lawlessness;
liberty actually hinged on the certainty
supplied by general rules. Such rules, or
leges legwn, served as both a guide for the
citizen and a restraint on the state (Hayek
1960, 167). Such a notion of liberty implied a relationship, analogous to a contract,
between the people and their rulers
(Reynolds 1987, 84). Indeed, the law functioned as an equally accessible protector of
the people's prerogatives (Hayek 1960,
166). Although this ideal did not reflect
later Imperial practices, the "recognized
ultimate basis" for all laws in ancient Rome
was professedly the will or consent of the
people themselves (Reynolds 1987, 84).
The ancient rule of law ideal received a
warm reception in sixteenth-century England. The terminology gradually changed
from the anglicized "isonomy" to "equality
before the law," or "a government of laws, "
and finally to "the rule of law," but the
concept of isonomia remained the same

(Hayek 1960, 164). In fact, legal equality
implied more in the traditional, British
context than an individual's formal standing
before a court. Hayek notes that the struggle between Parliament and the monarchy
further defmed the rule of law to include a
prohibition on the exercise of arbitrary
power: not simply power exercised by an
unauthorized source, but rather a usage in
violation of general, fundamental rules
(169). The rule of law principle of generality implied equality under the law, and prospectivity required that legal judgments be
based on the results of individual choices,
not on human caprice (Wormuth 1949,212).
Francis D. Wormuth has observed that
in classic constitutional theory, the doctrine
of separation of powers is a vehicle for
safeguarding the generality of rules: keeping the legislature from enforcing its own
laws, and the executive from judging its
own case (1949, 8). During the English
Civil Wars, John Lilburne, a leader of the
radical Leveler party, advocated separating
power among the distinct arms of the British
government organization as a way of confining the legislature to enacting only" general
and prospective rules" (Hickman 1983,
369). Although Parliament could not be
persuaded, nearly every American thinker of
the Founding era eventually accepted Montesquieu's separation of powers as an essential part of constitutional theory (369).
During the English Civil Wars this
"Enlightenment" conception of political
institutions managed to win the near-universal acceptance of ideas like common consent, the separation of powers, an independent judiciary, and written constitutions.
Significantly, each of these ideas is based on
the notion of the rule of law. Although in
Great Britain, especially just prior to the
Colonial rebellion, the classical concepts
were often subordinated to policy goals,

RULE OF LAW IDEAL 53
they have remained an integral part of modern conceptions about legitimate government.

The Rule of Law in America

To a large degree, the American statesman
inherited their conceptions of the rule of law
ideal from their English forebears. However, they made important contributions of
their own, especially in relation to the importance of established legal procedures.
One commentator, in fact, has observed that
many substantive rights enjoyed under Anglo-American legal systems depended on
traditional, procedural guarantees (Reid
1988, 69). Historical documents yield an
abundant supply of subtle references to the
rule of law and its procedural implications,
but I discuss here only a few of the more
interesting.
First, in his 1765 Commentaries, William Blackstone made reference to certain
fundamental legal principles of any legitimate government. When discussing the
sanctity of private property, he remarked
that
[T]he great charter has declared that no freeman
shall be disseised, or divested of his freehold, or of
his liberties, or free customs, but by the judgement
of his peers, or by the law of the land (Kurland
and Lerner 1987, 586)

Though he was a fIrm believer in the Lockean version of natural law, Blackstone defIned concepts like due process and the trial
by jury as legal stipulations, not immutable
principles. The example cited above illustrates that, for him, the Magna Carta was an
agreement on legal procedures between
sovereign and subjects, not simply a powersharing arrangement between nobility and
monarchy.

Blackstone further remarks that the legal
relationship between individual property
rights and the governing authority is, and
should be, controlled by traditional practices
and procedures, such as that of "full indemnifIcation" for seized property (586). The
seizure of property was not absolutely prohibited; rather, it was constrained by social
conventions which reduced the prospects of
its use. This idea later found its way into
the U.S. Constitution in the requirement of
"just compensation" for the exercise of the
government's eminent domain (see Amendment V.).
Second, in a 1771 speech, preparatory to
a Boston election, Protestant minister John
Tucker touched on many aspects of the
nature and purposes of government. His
remarks, interwoven with familiar religious
rhetoric, imply not only that his audience
needed no lengthy justifIcations or explanations of his political assertions, but also that
his listeners shared with him a commitment
to certain fundamental principles. One of
his observations was that "all laws and rules
of government [must] be as plain as possible" (Hyneman and Lutz 1983, 164).
For Tucker, this seemed like a basic
requirement in any society that expected its
laws to be obeyed. Citing John Locke, he
mentions that readily understandable laws
preclude the exercise of tyrannical authority
in the guise of complicated legal procedures;
indeed, the very defInition of tyranny is the
exercise of the state's coercive power without the sanction of legality (164). While
Tucker was not the fIrst, or the last, of the
Founding era to defIne the boundaries of
political legitimacy in this way, his arguments in an ostensibly religious discourse
suggests that the principles of the rule of
law had already become widely accepted in
colonial America.
SignifIcantly, those
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principles were also universally accepted by
the American Founders.
Third, many of the Founders understood
the limitations that the use of the law, as
such, placed on a legislature's methods.
The rule of law demanded that, in addition
to binding a government to obey its own
rules (see Federalist #33), any particular law
should be a known and stable rule (Federalist #62). James Wilson observed that "law
is called a rule, in order to distinguish it
from a sudden, a transient, or a particular
order: uniformity, permanency, stability,
characterize a law" (West 1987, 153). In
colonial America, this concept served to
distinguish tyranny from political legitimacy;
a government rules by dispassionate laws
and a tyrant rules by pointed, prejudicial
commands and the force of his will.
Fourth, by 1776 most American thinkers
had accepted the postulate that all authority
wishing the sanction of legality must conform to the principles stipulated by the
people themselves, and additionally, must
adhere to certain time-honored principles of
conventional legal procedure. When George
Mason of Virginia wrote the Virginia Declaration of Rights, one of the models for the
Bill of Rights, he included a number of
traditional, procedural guarantees, especially
in the area of criminal law. Among them
are prohibitions against excessive bail, cruel
and unusual punishments, self-incrimination,
and guarantees of search by warrant, trial by
jury, criminal convictions by unanimous
vote, the right to confront one's accuser,
and the ability to call witnesses in one's
behalf (Kurland and Lerner 1987, 6). Although many today see these provisions as a
burden on society, to the Founders they
represented a nearly insurmountable procedural barrier to those who would exercise
arbitrary or tyrannical power.

Fifth, when the colonists made their
break with Great Britain, the Declaration of
Independence contained the straightforward
charge that Parliament and the Crown had
disregarded the legal methods incumbent
upon any government. The document's
arguments are based primarily on a violation
of traditional legal practices, not on moral
or philosophical considerations. Thomas
Jefferson, the principal author, carefully
defended the colonists' separation with
England on legal grounds, and the eloquence
of the preamble should not obscure the
conscious attempt to do so (Reynolds 1987,
89).
Note the substance of a few of the colonists' complaints against the Crown: subordinating an independent judiciary; abolishing
charters and laws; convening the legislatures
in inconvenient locations; obstructing naturalization laws; depriving citizens of the
right to trial by a jury; and in general,
"abolishing the free system of English
laws." In short, although the Founders did
believe in natural laws and principles, they
sought conventional, legal justifications for
their actions. For the colonists, the demands of natural law and traditional legal
procedure were coextensive (Wood 1969,
10).
Gordon Wood concludes that the Founding Fathers "revolted not against the English
constitution but on behalf of it" (1969, 10).
Though they selectively borrowed ideas
from radical writers most favorable to the
American experience, they truly believed
that they were protecting their rights as
Englishmen (13). The American statesmen
were astonished that the British government,
previously regarded as a defender of liberty,
could disregard its own traditions and claim
that Parliament superseded the law (Reid
1988,57). For them, the violation of established procedures, with no expectation of
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redress or change, justified a revolution.
Their defense was that the English Crown
had threatened their liberty by abandoning
the universally accepted principles of the
rule of law, and they expected to be vindicated in the eyes of all who took legitimate
government seriously.
Sixth and finally, John Adams recognized that the basis for any government that
espoused republican principles would be the
rule of law ideal. He used a variation of the
modern term in his 1776 Thoughts on Government, claiming that a republican form of
government was "an empire of laws, not of
men" (Kurland and Lerner 1987, 108). In
his 1787 Defence of the Government of the
United States, he further insisted that free
governments must depend on the laws for
their legitimacy, and that legal processes for
addressing grievances must be available to
every citizen.

The Rule or Law and the Constitution
F. A. Hayek has noted that, for the Founders, a constitution signified a commitment to
the rule of law, as well as a safeguard
against the exercise of arbitrary power--by
the legislature and by the people themselves
(1960, 178). Since conventional legal procedures were not to be sacrificed to shortterm policy goals, constitutionalism also
entailed a commitment to abide by long-term
principles instead of short-term interests
(179). Though a written constitution could
not preclude or ultimately frustrate the will
of the people, it could limit the means by
which a temporary majority can pursue its
objectives (180).
In short, constitutional arrangements
were agreements to abide by fundamental
procedural norms.
Lawrence Friedman
believes that:

Every citizen must look up to the laws, as his
master, his guardian, and his friend; and whenever
any of his fellow-citizens, whether magistrates or
subjects, attempt to deprive him of his right, he
must appeal to the laws ... (346)

American statesmen tended to look upon a written
constitution as a kind of social compact--a basic
agreement among citizens, and between citizens
and state, setting out mutual rights and duties, in a
permanent form (1983, 115).

Although I have cited only a few out of
innumerable possible examples, they reveal
that by 1787, the concept and terminology
of the rule of law ideal had permeated almost every level of American political
discourse. As in the classical civilizations,
the rule of law, instead of human capriciousness, was seen as the protector of individual
freedom. The Founding of the United States
of America entailed an ambitious attempt to
implement the rule of law ideal into the
constitution of the nation's new government.
Though it does not exhaust the concept's
definition or implications, constitutionalism
is based upon the rule of law ideal.

Among Americans, a constitution embodied
a society-wide agreement. The state and
federal constitutions actually created certain
rights and duties additional to those the
people naturally enjoyed. They also grounded the authority and the formal limitations
on government in the express or implied
consent of the people (115).
The whole point behind constitutionalism, and indeed behind the rule of law, was
to protect liberty. Prior to the Revolution,
Americans commonly believed that the
antithesis of liberty was arbitrary authority
(Reid 1988, 59). Traditionally, Americans
believed that the law's whole purpose and
reason for existence was to restrain or
thwart the exercise of such arbitrary power
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(63). For some liberty-minded Americans,
"there was no accusation against an official
more serious than that he sought to impose
arbitrary rule" (55). Eighteenth-century
Britons believed that the king was most
likely to exercise arbitrary power and the
colonists saw the danger stemming from
Parliament; but both agreed that liberty
became vulnerable when the state began to
govern by subjective prerogative (79).
John Phillip Reid believes that the colonists thought their liberty depended on two
things: 1) that the laws of a society must be
based on the consent of the governed; and 2)
that all laws must be subject to the traditional requirements of legal due process, not
administered by discretionary authority (80).
Echoing Cicero, he observes that law was
the "central pillar" of the Americans' traditionalliberty; it owed its existence to legally
defined boundaries and without them could
not exist (60). According to eighteenthcentury thinkers, the law essentially balanced the natural inequalities of individuals
(62), creating the security necessary to enjoy
private property rights. The fictional "exchange" of a portion of one's personal
liberty for protection was widely endorsed
as a useful idea (68-71). Therefore the rules
and conventions of a well-established legal
process protected the people in the enjoyment of their property (and other) rights.
Although nearly all the Founders believed that substantive rights emerged from
nature, they recognized that one could only
enjoy such rights as a member of a civil
society. In his most interesting argument,
Reid contends that the rights the Americans
enjoyed were actually simple legal stipulations; in certain cases, rights well-founded
in tradition received the appellation of "natural" as well (64). In other words, many
basic rights were legal instead of natural.
Procedures like due process, compensation

for seizure of property, jury trials, and the
need for a warrant authorizing a search, all
helped reduce the likelihood that the state
could use coercion arbitrarily. Such conventions tended to preserve the ability to
freely pursue one's individual initiatives
within the boundaries prescribed by law. Ex
post facto laws and bills of attainder are
specifically prohibited by the American
constitution (and others) because they frustrate efforts to use the law as a guide for
individual initiative.
In this context, liberty for the American
Founders meant living under a constitutional
government and, in its eighteenth-century
formulation, constitutionalism was the notion
of rule by law in a civil society (74). Significantly, the procedural safeguards which
served as a protection against the tendency
towards arbitrary government formed the
crux of the Americans' constitutionalliberties (77). The notion of freedom that later
came to be associated with America's most
democratic principles was wholly a new idea
(77). "American Whigs," Reid notes, "continued to associate 'true liberty' with 'legitimate government,' and to define liberty as
government under the rule of law" (84).
For the Americans, the rule of law was, in
fact, constituted by customary legal procedures (85).

The Difficulties in Modern Discourse
While many critics have explored the Framers' emphasis on the rule of law, most
modem commentators tend to disregard the
procedural aspect of constitutionalism and
attempt to explain the phenomena in other
terms. Few have recognized any underlying
significance for the Founders' constitutional
theories. Charles Hyneman, for example,
cogently observes that since the Founders
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established the new national government by
legal enactment, the actions of the government were to be limited by laws (1977, 7).
Yet he then denies that the Founders hoped
to cement the rule of law ideal into a preferred position in the federal system. In his
modem view, the stability guaranteed by
legal procedures is necessarily subordinate
to public policies designed to advance the
people's collective well-being (11). Echoing
Hyneman's sentiments, Donald Lutz presents the rule of law as only one of several
competing political theories among the
Founders, and not as one with any particular
significance (1977, 62).
Hyneman and Lutz, at least, try to account for the rule of law's procedural aspect. Many commentators oversimplify the
rule of law ideal and its implications, concentrating instead on other assumptions or
facets of constitutionalism. Many careful
thinkers even dismiss the rule of law ideal
as simplistic. The most facile, yet frequently heard, objection to the idea of the rule of
law is that any government framed and
administered by fallible men cannot really
be a government of law, since it must ultimately rest on subjective political judgments.
Of course that statement begs the question by ignoring the enormous difference
between an essentially arbitrary system
based on human will and bounded by caprice, and one that is constituted, albeit
imperfectly, by traditional, procedural conventions. Most of the more fruitful, contemporary discussions on the Founders'
constitutional theories attempt to draw out
normative implications from the rule of law
ideal, yet even these often ignore the efficacy of established procedures as a constitutional curb on arbitrariness.
George and Scarlett Graham, for example, note that the Founders simply assumed

that 1) the government would be bound by
the same rules as the citizens, and 2) that
there would be certain permanent restraints
on government powers; otherwise their
efforts to write and ratify a constitution
become "nonsense" (1977, xiii). They even
conclude that the Constitution was based
upon the rule of law (xiii). Yet they miss a
prime opportunity to explore the reasons
why the Framers would prefer the rule of
law over any of their other possibilities.
In yet another case, although he recognizes that the Founders were profoundly
influenced by the classical notions of the
rule of law, Francis D. Wormuth criticizes
their views as naive. He asserts that, regardless of the generality or prospectivity of
a given rule, its content makes the real
difference; immoral laws can be administered impartially to everyone's detriment
(1949, 214). While this is, of course, true,
the point that Wormuth misses is that such
a risk is present in any legal system. Yet a
commitment to an impartial administration
of the laws, which purports to bind the
rulers as well as the citizens, does have the
tendency to minimize the likelihood that any
government will enact oppressive laws. For
the Founders, the impartial administration of
any rules was preferable to an existence
wholly dependent on a government's whim
and pleasure.
More recently, Thomas G. West has
offered a considered account of constitutionalism by attempting to ground its
assumptions in classical teleology. Taking
his arguments from the Federalist, he indicates that for the Founders all governments
shared the divine charge to advance the
welfare of their subjects (1987, 150). With
this in mind, he locates the Federalist's
treatment of the rule of law ideal in an
interesting combination of end-oriented
human reason and popular consent. He
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mentions the concept's classical definition
by observing that laws, as such, should
apply to large classes of people, not to
individuals, and that they should be public
and reasonably stable (153).
A written constitution, he continues,
should by definition bind the officials who
administer the government; it is alterable
only by the people, and not by legislative
enactment (156). For West
The rule of law, in sum, is a governmental practice
designed to make as likely as possible the coincidence of the two requirements of just government:
that it be by the consent of the people, and that it
secure the safety and happiness of society. The
law aims to embody the public's reason by requiring ... reasoned discussion and a rule of universal
application (153-54).

In at least one sense, West hints at the
argument offered in this paper. Requiring
the public's reasoned discussion on a given
decision seems analogous to my emphasis on
procedural norms; and his Kantian rules of
"universal application" do suggest the kinds
of general, prospective, and equal standards
discussed earlier. However, West hopes
that the rule of law can secure not only the
"safety" of stability and order, but the happiness of the people as well--which mayor
may not admit the kind of restrictions to
which they would readily consent. Balancing the two demands, consent and human
felicity, may actually make unreasonable
demands on fallible human reason. His
argument has Aristotelian overtones in that
it considers that the proper place of law is to
serve as the embodiment of human reason,
instead of an admittedly imperfect substitute.
In this sense, then, West seems to be more
optimistic about human nature and passions
than were the authors of the Federalist, who
were clearly influenced by the philosophy of
David Hume (White 1987, 198). In his

hopes that legal methods can successfully
direct society towards virtuous aims, West
runs into the precise problems of human
nature addressed by the Founders.
The Framers were aware of the inner
contradiction of popular government:
though the people are sovereign they are
often inclined to choose badly, at least in the
short run. If a people lost their capacity for
virtue they would become incapable of selfgovernment.
West points out that the
Founders were sure that a virtueless society
could not long remain free (see Federalist
#63 and #55); but the Founders realized that
virtue could only be encouraged by judiciouslyarranged institutions, not orchestrated by constitutional fiat. West seems to
hold out the hope that unaided human reason
can protect liberty. Sadly, it cannot.
Another approach used to justify the rule
of law ideal implicit in the Constitution
stems from the assumptions of the Enlightenment: that a society arranged around
certain models tends to control the worst
excesses of human nature. This is probably
the most popular explanation offered by
contemporary commentators.
David F.
Epstein defends this approach, taking as his
starting point James Madison's contention in
Federalist #57 that the object of any state's
constitution should be to recruit the wisest
and most virtuous men as the rulers, and
then to structure the government institutions
in a way that will encourage the exercise of
their virtue while they hold temporary office. Citing the example of the U.S. Senate,
he observes that the "constitution thus not
only grants powers, but also arranges offices
so as to encourage those powers to be used
well" (1990, 93).
He avoids the difficulties lurking in a
teleological scheme by contending that the
Founders were primarily concerned with
avoiding the evils of society, not with en-
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couraging the rational pursuit of aims adjudged socially worthy. Since rulers are
fallible mortals, they are likely to err, or
disagree, in their conceptions of the good.
Therefore the Founders believed that future
rulers only needed to know how to avoid the
dangers of arbitrary government (Epstein
1990,94). Frequent elections, which would
rotate the people's representatives in and out
of office, would guarantee that the rulers'
efforts always reflected the aspirations of the
people, and not their own personal ambitions (97). Thus "the Founders," he claims,
"looked not to a self-abnegating virtue to
guarantee public-spirited intentions but to a
self-aggrandizing spirit that would provoke
public-benefiting actions" (97).
Epstein correctly asserts that constitutionalism, as a way of structuring government, places both written and unwritten
restrictions on the ruling institutions (1990,
107). A written constitution cannot forbid
everything that the state might illegitimately
attempt, nor can it define every right enjoyed by the people or the degrees to which
power may be abused; the people reserve
certain unwritten limitations on the government's powers (107).
These unwritten
norms or standards are contained in, and
part of, the rule of law ideal. Epstein defines the rule of law as that which compels
the governors to control the exercise of their
own power. Finally, he notes that, concretely, the rule of law requires prospective
laws and a separation of powers.
However, Epstein believes that the rule
of law ideal is an incomplete constitutional
foundation for the following three reasons.
First, not all government activities are part
of the legal process; for example, the president has nearly unfettered power to conduct
war. Secondly, enforcing rules that are
themselves unvirtuous does not promote
virtue among the populace. And third, even

carefully separated powers can be usurped
and taken over by an ambitious branch or
individual (1990, 108). He sees the Founders' solution to these weaknesses in the
establishment of checks and balances which
distribute powers among different branches,
making each branches less dependent on the
good will of the others. The presidential
veto, a bicameral Congress, and the process
of judicial review tend to compensate politically for any defect in the legal process
(110).
Epstein's description of the failures of
the rule of law falls into several common
errors. Initially, he doesn't see that the
delegation of all constitutional powers,
including the president's war-making power,
is itself subject to the legal process and is
actually constrained (albeit loosely) by legal
and procedural barriers. His criticisms of
the ideal seems to be based on the mistaken
notion that incorporating the rule oflaw into
a system will lead to the best result in each
situation. No system can guarantee that.
The rule of law only tends to protect the
freedom of individuals because its procedural requirements discourage the abuse of
power. Finally, there is nothing in the
system of checks and balances that mends
the defects of the legal process, unless he
limits his defmition of that process to Congressional legislation. But that was not the
Founders' approach. Since it is a foundation, the rule of law is compatible with the
political conventions which shape our system.
A final way of fitting the rule of law into
American constitutionalism involves the
moral requirements of a just society. Ellis
Sandoz takes this approach and for him the
rule of law is synonymous with a free government (1990, 117). A government dedicated to preserving liberty and pursuing the
good of its citizens (instead of the good of
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its rulers), is one that is built upon a moral
framework adequate to the task (117-18).
He further notes that in Revolutionary
speeches, the call for justice is used interchangeably with the call for the rule of (or
by) law (201). Interestingly, he recognizes
that for those of the Founding era laws
universally entailed the people's common
consent, publicity, and equality under the
law (118-19). He then grounds the requirements of the rule of law in the dictates of
morality, not in tradition or conventional
procedures (120).
He views the Founders' efforts as "skillfully calculated" to encourage the rule of
divine reason in the affairs of men. Since
the Founders were aware that the occasional
ugliness of human nature could destroy even
the best social arrangements, the separation
of powers and a system of checks and balances neutralizes the problem of human
ambition (41-42).
The 'government of laws and not of men' ... is
precisely an insistence that the tyranny of the
passions (including those of the majority as well as
those of the single tyrant) be averted by having
'God and reason alone rule' (39).

Sandoz sees the political theories of the
Founders as profoundly influenced by their
religious convictions. Indeed they were.
But his idea of a cultural consensus--a subtle
blend of classical political theory and protestant theology--misses the mark. The Founders firmly believed in traditional religious
values, but they did not all share the convictions of John Adams--which Sandoz often
equates with those of the entire group. The
Founders' constitutional achievement was an
ambitious attempt to reduce arbitrariness by
establishing procedural norms that would
guarantee the stability, predictability, and
responsibility of the new government.

The moral reasoning Sandoz emphasizes
is certainly not incompatible with the Framers' procedural standards, such reasoning is
actually an effective support for the rule of
law. But constitutional conventions, as
such, do not depend upon morality for their
strength nor are they grounded in moral
demands. Moral reasoning would be hardpressed to justify the necessity of such
entities as due process, the jury trial, the
writ of habeas corpus, and the separation of
powers.
Additionally, although constitutionalism's assumptions about individual
liberty are supported by traditional moral
and religious values, the fact that the U.S.
Constitution (unlike the Declaration of
Independence) contains no outward manifestation of religious faith should indicate
something. At the very least, it suggests
that the Founders did not wish to stipulate
truths about government along partisan lines
of argument. At most, it implies that embodying traditional or religious values in the
very structures and functions of government
is not quite what the Founders had in mind.

The Limits of the Rule of Law
Although the rule of law ideal formed the
basis for many of their conceptions about
political legitimacy and constitutional government, the colonists recognized that the
rule of law ideal couldn't guarantee their
freedom (Reid 1988, 81). An ideal is not
self-enforcing. The Founders were convinced that if a people lacked the necessary
respect for the laws or for their fellow
citizens, then shielding individual freedom
through a legal process amounts to a hollow,
theoretical barrier (Wood 1969, 42). If,
however, a nation shares certain fundamental beliefs about the purposes behind the
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limitation of governmental authority, constitutionalism does tend to protect individual
liberty because it places limits on the state's
use of law and coercion, (Hayek 1960, 183;
Hickman 1983, 379). Many of the Founders, echoing Montesquieu, even linked the
freedom of a society to the moral fiber of its
people (Wood 1969, 35; Vetterli and Bryner
1987, 73). "A real community of shared
virtue is, by the Founding Fathers' analysis,
ultimately essential if free government is to
be supportable" (42).
The Founders' views presupposed the
existence of certain morals, traditions, and
practices, in both individuals and groups,
that would act as a restraint on any free
association. If any society proved itself
unable to exercise simple self-discipline, its
citizens were obviously incapable of selfgovernment and ripe for authoritarian domination. Laws, and even the rule of law,
would reflect the character of a people.
While the Framers believed that rights were
in the abstract real, they also recognized that
rights had no protection outside of a society's norms and conventions. This fact led
James Madison to the conclusion that "public opinion [ultimately] sets the bounds to
every government, and is the real sovereign

in every free one" (Kurland and Lerner
1987, 73).

Conclusions
As heirs of a rich heritage of political philosophy, the American Founders clearly
understood the concepts which formed the
basis for the rule of law ideal. Even before
the Constitutional Convention, they were
sure that the ancient concept should form the
basis of their structural and procedural
efforts. Although the Framers recognized
the limitations of the rule of law, they attempted to institutionalize the notion in the
U.S. Constitution. Because they understood
that the rule of law entailed more than mere
obedience to formal, procedural norms, they
were convinced that it would serve as the
most useful form of protection against the
abuse of power by arbitrary government.
While the rule of law could not itself guarantee society the benefits of individual
liberty, they understood that certain procedural standards, implied by the rule of law
ideal, could promote the conditions that
made liberty possible.
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The American Medical Association and Congress:
Disproportionate Power?
by
Clifford Roy Strachen

Introduction
Probably none of the founders of the American Medical Association in 1847 could have
imagined the size and strength the organization would have over a hundred years later
(Ippolito and Walker 1980). Over the past
fifty years the AMA has become a major
influence in health politics in America.
From the defeat of President Truman's
comprehensive national health insurance
initiatives in the 1940s (Feldstein 1988), to
the airline smoking bans in our day (AMA
1989), the AMA has exercised enormous
political power in Washington.
Considering that the medical profession
can only boast of a few of their associates in
Congress (two physicians, a dentist and a
public health educator in the Wist Congress) (Duncan 1989), and that physicians
themselves are only a small percentage of
the total U.S. population, the AMA wields

disproportionate influence relating to "the
development and implementation of [health]
policies" (Ippolito and Walker 1980, 295).
I will examine the relationship between the
American Medical Association and the
Congress of the United States to seek an
understanding behind the power of the
organization.
In doing so, I will discuss the history of
the AMA regarding its efforts to defeat the
many national health insurance policies
which have been proffered by their proponents. Then I will delve into the American
Medical Political Action Committee
(AMPAC) to show the enormity of the
AMA's power in electoral politics and its
influence on the policy process in Congress.
Finally, I will discuss the AMA's efforts in
the WIst Congress and the specific issues
being addressed therein.
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The AMA

as an Interest Group

Professional associations are frequently quite
successful in interest group politics. Their influence is important because the professions control
some of the most important services available to
the American public. How government regulates
such activities as the delivery of health care and the
distribution of justice has a great impact on the
standard of life enjoyed by American citizens. The
political activity of such groups, then, has a direct
effect on the daily lives of Americans. The professional societies have been relatively effective in
pressure group politics for a number of reasons.
First, most such groups represent a large segment
of the profession, and therefore speak with considerable authority. Second, the professions represent
areas of knowledge not readily or completely
understood by nonprofessionals.
Therefore,
government officials are likely to defer to the
expertise of the professional association on matters
relating to the practice of that profession. Third,
the professional societies are comprised generally
of high status, well-educated, economically privileged persons. This endows the societies with a
very favorable image as well as a reservoir of high
quality talent from which to draw. And fourth, the
professional societies normally have access to
substantial economic resources which may be used
to promote the goals of the group. The real key to
the success of such groups, however, is the maintenance of high membership rates. For such a group
to be consistently effective, it must be able to speak
as the representative of the profession, and only
earning the allegiance of the members of the
profession permits such an advantage. In order to
achieve this goal, the professional associations must
provide an attractive array of incentives, normally
consisting of both material and solidary benefits
(Ippolito and Walker 1980, 296-97).

The above quotation outlines some very
important features of professional associations like the American Medical Association. First, the AMA represents more than
half the physicians in America, as it has
since 1912. (Ippolito and Walker 1980). At
its peak in the 1960s it claimed as its membership nearly three-quarters of all practicing physicians.

Second, the medical profession is a field
which most do not understand or know well.
Congress and the Health and Human Services Agency (formerly Health, Education and
Welfare) readily allow the AMA to testify
before hearings and to offer suggestions on
health policy.
Third, even though Dr. Joseph Hatch,
prominent in Utah's state delegation to the
AMA, claims that the term "rich doctor" no
longer applies in America, medical practitioners still earn higher incomes than most
other professionals or laborers. The public
still holds the AMA in high regard according to a 1976 Gallup poll which showed the
AMA and the American Dental Association
holding higher public confidence than the
National Rifle Association, the American
Bar Association, the news media, labor
unions, federal agencies and business corporations (Campion 1984).
Finally, the AMA and the American
Medical Political Action Committee
(AMPAC) have been able to raise tremendous amounts of money to pursue their
agenda. Dr. Hatch (1990) figures that their
success lies in collecting dues and donations
from only twenty percent of its members.
There is a common perception that
"Congress has been afraid to take on runaway physician costs [or many health related
issues] because of the immense political
clout of the American Medical Association"
(Rovner 1989, 387). The AMA led the
defeat of Truman's proposal in the 1940s,
Carter's 1979 bill on hospital cost containment (Feldstein 1988), and a host of other
proposals in the past fifty years. The AMA,
opposed to government interference and
regulation in health care, is responsible for
the stigma of "socialized medicine," a label
it often used in congressional hearings, and
in their media and grassroots campaigns
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against Truman and others (Congressional
Quarterly 1968).
The AMA "doggedly fought every major
proposal which would lead to a change in
the relatively independent status of the
individual medical practitioner" (Ippolito and
Walker 1980, 294) and continues to look
after the "common economic interests of all
physicians [and] the maintenance of f~-for
service practice without government mfluence" (Feldstein 1988, 42). Dr. Hatch
(1990) refutes the charge that the AMA "is
just out to increase [its] pocket books" by
noting AMA efforts at banning smoking on
all airline flights, its push for alcohol warning labels, and its pressure for universalizing
childhood immunizations.
Yet, while the AMA has been somewhat
successful in these policy areas, it has been
relatively ineffective, Greely (1989) argues,
in promoting its own self-interests. Perhaps
the AMA' s greatest triumphs came in its
ability to rally others around specific causes,
especially "social medicine" in the 1940s.

National Health Insurance and the AMA
Any discussion on the AMA' s influence in
Congress must include, at the very least, a
cursory summation of efforts towards National Health Insurance (NHI) in this country (see Appendix). Stunned by Truman's
victory in the 1948 presidential race, in
which he campaigned for "a package of
social benefits that included a program of
compulsory national health insurance" (153),
the AMA quickly moved "to oppose the
enslavement of the medical profession"
(154). The AMA has been, and continues
to be, the staunchest foe of "socialized
medicine. "
The key issue in government-provided
health care, from its early roots in

Roosevelt's Social Security package of 1935
until this day, has been aptly enunciated by
Feldstein:
Should the federal role be limited to assisting the
indigent, by means of federal grants to the states
under the public assistance (charity) programs? Or
should the federal government assume a broader
responsibility and undertake to pay for the medical
and hospital costs of the entire population, or at
least specified age groups, without regard to the
financial status or ability to pay of the aid recipient" (1988, 77)?

The NHI issue has evolved considerably
since 1935. From Truman to Kennedy the
debate continued but nothing significant
occurred.
Bills introduced in Congress
usually died in Committee. The battle lines
were effectively drawn. Proponents of NHI,
including such groups as the AFL-CIO,
independent labor unions, and senior citizens
groups saw the need to extend health care to
the many senior citizens, and poor who
could not afford adequate health care. Main
opponents of NHI included the AMA, the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, state manufacturing associations, drug companies, and
insurance groups (Congressional Quarterly
1968).
Realizing that it was losing ground to
NHI momentum, the AMA continued its
grassroots letter writing campaign and work
on ways to improve health care for the aged.
This resulted in the AMA's "Eldercare"
proposals--a voluntary method of health
insurance for the elderly (Congressional
Quarterly 1968). Throughout the period,
the AMA and its allies encouraged voluntary
private health insurance and did not oppose
federal aid to destitute and low-income
persons who would qualify under state
welfare programs. In 1950, Congress authorized federal grants to states for medical
care for those under public assistance (Congressional Quarterly 1968).
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Lobbying efforts in the period 1957-1965
were intense and directed at both Congress
(to sway votes) and "at the public to educate
and create consciousness" (Ripley and
Franklin 1980, 165). At a 1961 hearing the
"Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Abraham A. Ribicoff, accused the
AMA of using 'a bogeyman of socialized
medicine' to frighten people into opposing
the administration plan for health care of the
aged". President Kennedy countered "the
bogeyman" by insisting an "absolute freedom of choice . . . was guaranteed"
(Worsnop 1961, 582).
As the 1960s progressed, it became
evident that some form of government health
program was to become a reality. Still, the
AMA fought on, spending $1.2 million in
its Washington lobbying efforts and in two
nationwide publicity campaigns (Congressional Quarterly 1968). These included (as
major efforts do today) letter writing campaigns, media blitzes, visits of association
members to their Congressmen, and inducing state and local governments to make
statements favorable to the AMA position.
The AMA spent $829,484 for exposure in
one hundred daily newspapers, radio, and
television during the first quarter of 1965
when the Medicare bill was being considered.
Ripley and Franklin quote Theodore
Marmor on the Medicare debate:
[The] debate [was] cast in terms of class conflict.
. .. The leading adversaries ... brought into the
opposing camps a large number of groups whose
interests were not directly affected by the Medicare
outcome. . .. Ideological charges and countercharges dominated public discussion, and each side
seemed to regard compromise as unacceptable. In
the end, the electoral changes of 1965 reallocated
power in such a way that the opponents were
overruled.
Compromise was involved in the
detailed features of the Medicare program, but the

enactment itself did not constitute a compromise
outcome for the adversaries (1980, 164-65).

In any case, Medicare, and Medicaid
soon came into being. With them, health
expenditures as a percentage of GNP have
risen dramatically in 25 years. Regulation
.
'
It seems, has tended to hide symptoms Gust
as the AMA feared) while exacerbating the
real problems, creating a cartel" for the
regulated sectors in the industry (Enthoven
1977). Instead, the AMA argues, we need
to be more concerned with types of national
health insurance since it now exists in varying degrees and forms for different groups.
II

The AMA/AMPAC Relationship
As the AMA has grown, its interests, activities, and membership have become diverse.
In 1965 the organization created the American Medical Political Action Committee to
separate the different aspects of the AMA
into cohesive units of operation in the power
game. The AMA continues to concentrate
on its Washington lobby activities--trying to
persuade people through its grassroots
movement and by direct pressure on Congressmen. The AMA remains "a distributor
of valuable information regarding the status
of the nation's health and the diagnosis and
treatment of disease" (Ippolito and Walker
1980, 294). Indeed, the AMA recognizes
"the political, as well as the societal, advantages for supporting medical research"
(Feldstein 1988, 156). The AMA remains
the nation's premiere professional association due to its large size, the skill of its
organization, and its financial clout. AMA
activities continue to include national publicity campaigns in the media, educational and
research programs, and especially, its Washington Lobby. AMPAC has become an
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Since
effective arm of the AMA.
AMPAC's domain is electoral politics it has
become expert in the tactics of campaigning,
raising and spending money, and much
more.
As a money raiser, AMPAC has done
very well. In 1981-82, $2.5 million was
raised; $1.7 million of that was contributed
to Congressional elections. These totals
were second (in both categories) only to the
National Realtors PAC (Sabato 1984, 2021).
In 1983-84, AMPAC raised
$4,032,365 of which 46 percent was directly
contributed to candidates and another 11
percent was used in independent expenditures (Stanley and Niemi 1988, 147). 198586 was an even better year for AMPAC: it
raised $5.4 million and contributed $2.1
million to federal candidates (148).
AMPAC consistently ranks in the top ten
(often in the top five) campaign spenders
just as the AMA did before AMPAC. From
1946-1966, the AMA ranked among the top
lobby spenders, topping the list four times
(Congressional Quarterly 1968). Since its
inception in 1965, AMPAC has continued
the tradition of strength.
Interestingly
enough, Dr. Hatch contends that these
numbers are being reached from the donations of only 20 percent of the total membership. Per capita (in the AMA), these
numbers represent a thirty-six to thirty-eight
dollar contribution. AMPAC is raising
some $2.5 million dollars per two year
election cycle.
Close relationships are important to the
AMA and AMP AC since it is these ties that
help when the pressure is on for specific
legislative measures. Dr. Hatch pointed out
that AMNAMPAC have close ties to many
in Congress (some of whom are spouses or
children of physicians). One reason ophthalmologists are so involved, he suggested,
has been the budget cuts specifically affect-

ing their specialty. In recent years, Congress has reduced Medicare funding for
cataract surgery six times because that line
on the budget was much larger than prostrate surgery, which affects a larger portion
of the population (Hatch 1990).
Dr. Hatch and AMPAC feel fortunate
for their close relations with all of Utah's
Congressmen. Especially impressive was
Hatch's intimation that First District Representative Jim Hansen and Leon Sorensen, an
executive vice-president ofUMPAC (Utah's
Medical PAC), "signed each other's temple
recommends, " since Bishop Sorenson (in the
LDS Church) and Stake President Hansen
lived in the same ward. "It is just possible
that when those two talk on the phone they
understand each other" (Hatch 1990).
Moreover, Hatch maintains, the Utah delegation of the AMA has close, personal ties
with all of Utah's Congressmen. Incidentally, UMPAC actively supported Dean
Bristow, a physician who ran for Howard
Nielson's vacated Third District seat.
Sometimes, however,
the AMA faces a problem when a doctor runs for
Congress and the group's staff prefers his opponent. ·We can be under a lot of pressure from our
membership to give to the physician,· said an
AMA official (Congressional Quarterly 1982,46).

In any case, AMPAC supports favorable
Congressional candidates. This is part of "a
friendly incumbent policy. We always stick
with the incumbent if we agree with both
candidates" insists Peter Lauer, executive
director of AMPAC (Sabato 1984, 72).
However, as Ornstein and Elder point out,
"the AMA is especially aggressive" (1978,
62) in pursuing negative endorsements
(denying campaign support) in favor of an
incumbent's rival. In 1980, AMPAC funds
were used to defeat Representative Andrew
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MacGuire (D-NJ) , because he had proved
difficult to work with (Sabato 1984).
On the other hand, AMPAC has rewarded others, who in 1982, voted favorably, or
cosponsored a bill exempting professional
organizations from Federal Trade Commission regulations: the AMA and the American Dental Association gave more than $1.5
million during the 1982 election (Sabato
1984). In 1964, as an earlier example,
AMA funds were used on House Ways and
Means Committee members who had opposed Medicare's predecessors in the past.
The AMA and AMPAC are notably bipartisan, says Hatch. Ornstein and Elder support
this notion "noting that the California Medical Political Action Committee gave money
in 1974 to both extremely liberal Democrats
(like Ron Dellums) and extremely conservative Republican's (like Barry Goldwater,
Jr.)" (1978, 72-73).

AMPAC's Political Activities
AMPAC's activities are probably wider than
most people suspect. Dr. Hatch pointed out
that there are more activities under the
Department of Political Education than
under the Department of Political Action.
However, one should not lose sight of the
obvious imbalance in expenses on the latter
side. I have already discussed direct contributions above and must now address independent expenditures and in-kind services.
"In-kind" contributions are those which
are tangibles--a service, or activity--rather
than monetary. One of the more common
examples of this are the "meet and greet"
receptions AMPAC hosts (AMPAC 1990)
where physicians and politicians meet together in order to discuss politics or medicine, always with the intention of promoting
a specific candidate or candidates while

encouraging individual contributions.
AMPAC places much emphasis on personal
relationships with the candidates it backs.
Another effective in-kind contribution
AMPAC favors is the "benchmark survey. "
This is where "AMPAC contracts with
nationally recognized consultants to conduct
polling on behalf of a Congressional candidate, then presents the results to the campaign" (AMPAC 1990). The law allows a
"sixty-one day rule" which "permits a PAC
to depreciate the cost of a poll by 50 percent
if it waits sixteen days . . . to deliver it, and
by a massive 95 percent if delivery is postponed more than sixty days" (Sabato 1984,
94). AMPAC conducted surveys for thirtysix candidates in 1982 at a cost of $380,000
but reported only $89,000 by following
these guidelines.
I have mentioned in passing the use of
independent expenditures in campaigning.
AMPAC's use of independent expenditures
began in 1978, and have been very effective
for them in a number of campaigns.
AMPAC has undertaken, according to the
AMPAC pamphlet, "only those expenditures
which can be viewed in a positive and informative light" (1990). Independent expenditures are exactly that: independent of the
candidates for whom benefit is intended.
The AMPAC has made extensive use of
television and radio spots, magazines, newspapers, billboards, and mass mailings in
campaigns around the country. "In 1982, it
spent $212,000 on television and radio spots
and targeted direct mail for thirteen House
candidates. In previous elections, AMP AC
paid for buttons and magazine advertising
independently" (Sabato 1984, 107).
Under its political eduction program,
AMPAC seeks to educate the public to the
realities of health care and politics and to
improve candidates' responsiveness to constituent issues after the election. Of course,
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the premise behind these activities is that
when the AMA needs to exert its influence,
it will have a Congressman who will respond.
AMPAC utilized 50 percent of its budget
on political education in 1984. Regional
seminars stress voter registration, get-out-tovote-drives, and telephone contacting.
Through activities such as Participation '92,
AMPAC encourages physicians and their
spouses to obtain delegate status to national
party nominating conventions (Hatch 1990).
Dr. Hatch promotes AMPAC's candidate
and campaign management schools. He
argues that what they do is to give some
prime motivation and expertise in running
for Congress. Candidate Dean Bristow,
whom I mentioned previously, made his
decision to run for Congress after attending
these programs. Representative John Bryant
of Texas commented:
Anytime someone, whether a person or a PAC,
gives you a large sum of money, you can't help but
feel the need to give them extra attention, whether
it is access to your time or, subconsciously, the
obligation to vote with them Sabato 1984, 126).

While the idea of a "subconscious obligation" may indeed be a factor, AMPAC
President Peter Lauer denies any connection
between AMPAC money and legislative
issues. Common Cause, however, purports
that a significant relationship exists between
AMPAC donations and votes in Congress.
Sabato writes:
Common Cause cited the defeat of President
Carter's Hospital Cost Containment Act of 1977 as
an example of AMPAC's influence. Of the 234
House members who voted for a crippling amendment to the act, 202 had been given $1.65 million
in contributions during their 1976 and 1978 campaigns, with an average receipt of over $8,100 per
member (1984, 132).

Sabato, however, is quick to point out that
"correlation does not prove causation"
(132).
AMPAC has what Sabato calls, "the
most elaborate national-state PAC arrangements" and notes that "several of AMPAC's
forty-eight state associates (including those
in California, Texas, and Illinois) are among
the largest state PACs in the country" (119).
AMPAC works with its state counterparts
like the Utah Medical Political Action Committee to raise funds jointly. According to
their guidelines, however, the two must
keep their monies separate and for the purposes intended.
The Utah chapter of
AMPAC may donate to Utah Congressmen
or others in Congress but UMPAC, alone,
can donate to campaigns for the Utah legislature. AMPAC looks to its state associates
for its grassroots strengths and for information on congressional races (Hatch 1990).
The relationship between the AMA and
AMPAC is interesting. According to the
campaign reform laws of 1971 and 1976,
funding for the two must be kept separate.
Each has its specific jurisdiction--the AMA
is a lobby and public educator, and AMPAC
is a political arm created to influence electoral politics. To this end, AMPAC contributes over $1 million per year (Ippolito and
Walker 1980). The technically separate
relationship between the two leads to contradicting behavior since the AMA may decide
it needs to lobby a specific Senator while
AMPAC may find it in its interests to effectively ignore the same Senator. I think,
however, that such conflicting behavior is
rare.
AMPAC is concerned about campaign
finance reform, says Dr. Hatch (1990). He
does not like the $5,000 limits on campaign
contributions, but recognizes their value in
preventing wholesale purchases of elections.
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The AMA and the 101st

Con~

Health care today, as good as it is for those
who have it, is still unavailable to an estimated 33 million Americans who lack the
means to qualify for or purchase health
insurance programs (Associated Press 1990).
Congress, in its efforts to close this gap, has
introduced a bill requiring employers to
provide basic health insurance to all fulltime employees (Fuchs 1990). Fuchs contends that over 80 percent of the uninsured
are employed or live in families of employed workers. This problem could be
alleviated by the above mentioned bill.
Surprisingly, this bill in many ways
parallels the AMA' s latest proposal "Health
Access America" which Dr. Hatch discussed
in our interview. According to the Associated Press (1990), the AMA plan includes the
expansion of Medicaid to all who live below
the poverty level; requires employers to
provide health coverage and proposes tax
deductions to help with costs; provides risk
pools for the uninsurable and tax incentives
for long term care insurance programs; and
changes the malpractice laws. In all, the
AMA proposal has sixteen points which, if
implemented, would cost an estimated $60
billion. The AMA declined to discuss the
financing of the proposal except to say it
"would require some increased taxes" (Associated Press 1990).
Perhaps the main difference between the
AMA's proposal and Congress' is cost
containment. Congress has discussed implementing a system based on the Canadian
model of a "fee schedule." The AMA, of
course, is opposed to most forms of cost
containment and would fight hard against it.
Many Americans prefer a system like Canada's but the AMA is quick to point out
Canadian weaknesses. James H. Sammons

(AMA executive vice-president) notes:
"The presumption that an awful lot of pe0ple seem to be making is that somehow
Canada has solved all of their problems.
That is erroneous. . . . It is not all peaches
and cream up there" (Rovner 1989a, 391).
The AMA particularly dislikes provincial
"expenditure targets" which control volume
by percentage reductions. Sammons labels
them "Russian roulette." Apparently,
the
AMA has endorsed the Medicare fee schedule, but opposes balance-billing limits and
expenditure targets, claiming such methods
"lead to rationing of health care, which
would have grave impact on the health and
welfare of our nation's elderly" (Rovner
1989b, 588).
The AMA is concerned that Medicare
and Medicaid are taking more than their
share of budget cuts. It is "a mistaken
impression that physicians have been relatively untouched by past budget cutting
actions" (U.S. Congress 1989, 140). Since
Medicare reimbursements and fees were
frozen in varying degrees between 1983 and
1988, physicians have borne the brunt of
some of these cuts. The AMA is determined not to be hurt by more. Therefore, it
supports a review of physician reimbursement and a revised payment system which
would dissipate inequities in the system
(U.S. Congress 1989).
Small businesses and other opponents
balk at the employer-provided health care
proposal since under the proposed guidelines
full-time workers (at minimum wage) would
be required to spend 19 percent of their
wages and half-timers 39 percent for basic
health insurance (Gajda 1987). Employers
contend that the higher operating costs
associated with the proposed insurance
programs would put many out of business.
At this writing, the program still has not
passed and probably will not.
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The AMA has been heavily involved in
current health care proposals. Major agenda
items include pressing for a quality review
agency within the Public Health Service,
alcohol warning labels, airline smoking
bans, new legislation to further reduce
tobacco product advertising, more lenient
children's disability coverage, and tax incentives for health care providers and selfinsurers. The AMA has already secured
some victories with regulatory relief from
bureaucratic and congressional encroachment. To be sure, the AMA will continue
efforts at securing legislation favorable to
the improvement of health care in America
while resisting government advances into
their domain.

Conclusion
From the first time the American Medical
Association labeled government provided
health care proposals "socialized medicine, "
the AMA has held a strong hand in American politics. The AMA and AMPAC have

been effective in the political process. The
AMA with its Washington lobby has done
much in the way of public health education
in Congress and toward the public.
The AMA has and will likely maintain
its status as a major mover for some time.
Together with AMPAC, the AMA is one of
the largest financial contributors to the
election process and the effects of that
influence have been, and will continue to be
felt for many years.
Having lost the Medicare battle, the
AMA has changed its tune in the last twenty
years--especially in the last ten. Today, the
AMA is concerned with improving the
quality of health care for all and easing the
financial burden of medical care on the
middle and upper middle class. The AMA
recognizes that public sentiment leans more
and more to NHI alternatives and now seeks
the next best alternatives where costs will
neither be prohibitive nor government interference rampant.
AMPAC is concerned, too, because
more stringent campaigning finance reform
laws would obviously weaken their influence
and position in the political establishment.

APPENDIX
Chronology on national medical insurance
1935 . . . . . . .
Roosevelt administration explores compulsory national health insurance as part of the
Social Security Act, but no legislation is recommended to Congress.
1943 . . . . . . .
Three Democratic Senators cosponsor a bill to broaden the Social Security Act to include
compulsory national health insurance to be financed with a payroll tax. No legislative
action.
1945 . . . . . . .
President Truman, in his health message, proposes a medical insurance plan for persons
of all ages, to be financed through a Social Security tax.
1949 . . . . . . .
The Truman proposal is considered and hotly contested in congressional hearings; no
legislative action results.
1954 . . . . . . .
President Eisenhower opposes the concept of national health insurance as "socialized
medicine." He proposes the alternative of reimbursing private insurance companies for
heavy losses on private health insurance claims. No action taken on this proposal.
1957 . . . . . . .
Representative Forand introduces the "Forand bill," to provide hospital care for needy old
age Social Security beneficiaries to be financed through increased Social Security taxes.
No action taken by Congress, but heavy AFL-CIO lobbying generates public interest.
1960 . . . . . . .
The Forand bill was defeated by the House Ways and Means Committee on a decisive
vote (17-8). Chairman Mills opposed the bill.
1960 . . . . . . .
As a substitute for the Forand bill, Congress enacts the Kerr-Mills bill, designed to
encourage the states to help older, medically needy persons (those not poor enough to
qualify for Old Age Assistance, but too poor to pay their medical bills).
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1960 . . . . . . .
Health care is an issue in the presidential campaign; Kennedy vows support.

1961-1964 ....
President Kennedy's version of the Forand bill is submitted annually in the House and
Senate, but the House Ways and Means Committee defeats it.
1962 . . . . . . .
Senate defeats an amendment to a public welfare bill embodying the Kennedy proposal
(52-48).
1964 . . . . . . .
The Senate passes (49-44) a Medicare plan similar to the administration proposal as an
amendment to the Social Security Act. The plan died when the House conferees (from
the Ways and Means Committee) refused to allow its inclusion.
Jan. 1965 ....
The 1964 elections brought many new Democrats to Congress, and the composition of
the Ways and Means Committee is finally changed to have a majority of Medicare
supporters.
Jan. 1965 ....
President Johnson makes medical care his number one legislative priority.
July 1965 ....
Medicare bill signed into law after passage in both houses by generous margins.
Compiled by Ripley and Franklin (1980, 163). Originally adapted from material in Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1965: 236-247.
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